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This Note will look at the role of four broad factors that correspond
with the rise-and-fall cycles among leading international financial centers.
The four factors are: trust in a financial center’s abilities; the central bank-
ing and monetary policy systems of the center’s home nation; the home
nation’s landscape of financial policy and regulation; and the overall stabil-
ity of the financial center itself.  First, this Note will undertake a broad
historical survey of the shifts in prominence from Amsterdam to London,
from London to New York, and from New York back to London to define
the scope of these factors through analyzing how they have manifested and
evolved over time.  In order to further understand the limits of these fac-
tors, this Note will also analyze two historical instances where two cities
vied for the position of the leading international financial center, Paris ver-
sus London and Tokyo versus New York, and no corresponding shift oc-
curred, despite the manifestation of some of the factors.  In addition, to
understand the role of politics in influencing these factors, this Note will
also consider the shift between the financial centers of Frankfurt and Berlin
during the nineteenth century. After defining the scope of the factors
through this broad historical survey, this Note will analyze the presence of
these factors in the modern international financial system in light of Brexit
in order to assess their predictive capabilities. Lastly, this Note will con-
sider the future relevance of international financial centers as a critical
structure within the international financial system, and whether the factors
might shed any light on the likelihood that emerging disruptive technolo-
gies might render international financial centers obsolete.
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INTRODUCTION
An international financial center is a centralized location where vari-
ous financial intermediaries, both foreign and domestic, come together to
coordinate their activities.1  At present, London is arguably the leading
international financial center.2 However, in the wake of the Brexit refer-
endum on June 26, 2016, there has been much speculation regarding the
future of London’s position within the international financial system.3
While there are a number of candidates with the potential to surpass
London,4 accurately assessing the likelihood of London faltering in its po-
sition, or the actual strength of these candidate financial centers, is quite
difficult. In searching for guidance in making this assessment, history may
provide some assistance. While the adage that past performance is no
guarantee of future results undoubtedly applies in this line of inquiry, by
looking broadly across history at the rise-and-fall cycles among leading
international financial centers, one can identify a set of correlative factors:
trust in a financial center’s capabilities; the central banking and monetary
policy systems of the center’s home nation; that  nation’s landscape of fi-
nancial policy and regulation; and the overall stability of a financial center
itself.5  While these factors are by no means exhaustive, and more often
1. See Youssef Cassis, International Financial Centres, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL HISTORY 293, 293 (Youssef Cassis et al. eds., 2016).
2. See, e.g., MARK YEANDLE, 21 GLOBAL FINANCIAL CENTRES INDEX 4 tbl.1 (2017)
[hereinafter GFCI 21] (showing London as the highest rated international financial center on
its index evaluating the relative strength of such financial centers).
3. See, e.g., Tom Campbell, Can Post-Brexit London Survive as Europe’s Cultural and
Financial Capital?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2017, 2:07 AM)), https://www.theguardian.com/ cit-
ies/2017/jan/23/post-brexit-london-economic-self-sabotage (speculating as to how the Brexit
negotiations may impact London’s status as a financial center, among other things).
4. See, e.g., Gavin Finch, Dublin Is Best EU City for Bankers Fleeing Brexit, Study
Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 22, 2017, 3:11 AM)), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-03-22/dublin-is-best-eu-city-for-bankers-fleeing-brexit-study-says; Jonathan Ford,
London and New York Lose Ground to Asian Rivals in Finance Rankings, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Mar. 26, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/63aa3a1c-10b6-11e7-a88c-50ba212dce4d (provid-
ing a list of potential cities within the European Union where bankers might move post-
Brexit and identifying the possibility that Brexit may result in some financial activity leaving
Europe entirely for New York or Asian financial centers, like Singapore or Hong Kong).
5. These general factors are consistent with those that have been previously identified
by other scholars as having relevance in determining the relative strength of an international
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than not tend to intermingle among one another, understanding and ap-
plying these factors facilitates better predictions about which financial cen-
ters, if any, might surpass London.
Addressing first the factor of trust, while trust may be viewed by some
as a fundamental feature of the financial system generally,6 it also plays an
instrumental role in driving the rise-and-fall cycles of leading international
financial centers. Through analyzing the various manifestations of trust
across these cycles, the key elements of trust that emerge are: perceptions
of the center’s experience; relationships between the center’s financial in-
stitutions and foreign ones; and the center’s connections to other markets,
both foreign and domestic.
A financial center’s experience has multiple dimensions, including the
experience of individual firms with certain kinds of transactions, and, more
broadly, the perceived experience of the financial center itself, based on
the kinds of transactions the center has historically managed. Additionally,
experience manifests through immigration flows into the center, as the in-
flux of foreign traders effectively imports experience into the center. As-
sessment of a center’s relationships which historically focused on
interpersonal relationships more broadly, now focuses specifically on busi-
ness connections. Lastly, a center’s market connections typically manifest
through connections both to a strong domestic economy as well as interna-
tional markets. However, as London’s rise in the late twentieth and early
twenty-first century helps to illustrate, the center’s connections to interna-
tional markets became significantly more important with the globalization
of financial activity.
The central banking and monetary policy of a given center’s home na-
tion plays an instrumental role in either shifting the gravity of the interna-
tional financial system toward, or away from, the center. In particular, an
effective central bank has been critical in determining a given financial
center’s relative rise or decline ever since London overtook Amsterdam in
the early nineteenth century. Equally critical has been monetary policy,
too, which is often indistinguishable from the element of central banking.
While this latter point is largely due to the substantial degree of control
that modern central banks have over monetary policy, monetary policy has
stood apart from central banking with respect to the strength of the
financial center throughout history. See, e.g., YOUSSEF CASSIS, CAPITALS OF CAPITAL: THE
RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTERS 1780–2009, 286–92 (Jacqueline Col-
lier trans., 2010) [hereinafter CAPITALS OF CAPITAL] (describing “staying power and change,”
which includes aspects of stability and trust, “the monetary factor,” and the relationship be-
tween “state and finance” as being relevant factors in analyzing the historical rise-and-fall of
international financial centers).
6. See, e.g., OLIVIER COISPEAU, FINANCE MASTERS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL FINANCIAL CENTERS IN THE LAST MILLENNIUM 285 (2016) (“Finance people support
trustworthiness not only because they think this is a just and moral cause, but also because of
the glow they get from the idea of being trusted, and for some because they realise that
ultimately the market can only build on trust. . . . [A]s a few hundred years of banking history
has shown, trustworthiness comes first as the foundation of any longstanding financial hub.”).
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center’s currency. However, even though currency strength has historically
had an impact on the overall strength of a given international financial
center, in light of more recent developments this aspect of monetary policy
seems to have been severed from influencing the relative strength of a
financial center.
National financial policy, which is often intertwined with central bank-
ing and monetary policy systems manifests most often through the depth
and quality of the regulatory framework within a financial center and a
center’s openness to promoting innovation or alternative focus on safety
and soundness within its financial sector. Throughout history a given na-
tion’s political stances have had a profound effect on the relative strength
of a financial center, as certain stances have been incredibly influential in
determining not only the course of financial regulation, but also the course
of central banking policy and where a financial center might come to be
located within the nation. However, the historical record discussed below
suggests that the ideal balance of state involvement in financial policy re-
mains largely ambiguous, at least with respect to influencing the relative
position of an international financial center, as both extensive and minor
state involvement have at times both benefited and harmed the position of
an international financial center.
Addressing fourth the factor of stability, historically this factor has
often served a largely catalytic role in the progression of rise-and-fall cy-
cles. At least in earlier rise-and-fall cycles, there would often be a signifi-
cant war that would bring about the two-part effect of weakening the
former leading international financial center, while strengthening the as-
cendant financial center. However, in more recent cycles the element of
war has yielded to the element of economic crises, which now appear to
have a more substantial impact in catalyzing a shift, though perhaps with
the additional effect of making such shifts less obvious than they were in
previous cycles. Furthermore, there is the possibility that Brexit-like
events may come to represent a new class of destabilizing events that
could affect a center’s stability in the future. At this stage, however, the
potential destabilizing effects of Brexit are far too speculative to accu-
rately categorize such an event as truly ranking alongside wars and eco-
nomic crises as the kind of destabilizing event that could catalyze a shift in
prominence among leading international financial centers.
Applying this basic framework regarding the factors, this Note seeks to
further conceptualize them to analyze the likelihood that London might be
surpassed by a capable ascendant financial center and to assess the future
relevance of international financial centers as a key structure within the
international financial system. To accomplish this goal, Part I of this Note
will undertake a broad historical overview of the rise-and-fall cycles
among leading international financial centers to better define the four fac-
tors through case-specific examples. Part I will also consider additional
historical cases, specifically the overtaking of Frankfurt by Berlin, the
failed attempt by Paris to overtake London, and the failed attempt by To-
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kyo to overtake New York, to better illustrate some unique ways in which
the factors may manifest, as well as their potential limitations.  Then,
building on this historical background, Part II will apply the factors to the
state of the international financial system in the wake of Brexit.  Through
this application, this Note will seek to understand what the factors might
reveal about the strength of London’s position as the leading international
financial center and the likelihood that another financial center, specifi-
cally, Frankfurt, New York, or Singapore will surpass London.  In contrast
to this discussion, Part III will briefly analyze the future importance of
international financial centers as a key structure within the international
financial system in light of emerging disruptive technologies and consider
what guidance historical parallels and the factors might provide in this in-
quiry.  Lastly, Part IV will conclude.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. Amsterdam to London
By modern standards, Amsterdam emerged as the first true interna-
tional financial center during the seventeenth century.7  Crucial to Am-
sterdam’s emergence was its connection to a strong domestic commercial
and trading economy, which was brought about by the city’s status as a
central trading port in Europe.8 Moreover, state financial policies in the
Netherlands helped to reinforce and strengthen the financial activities that
were developing in Amsterdam during this period by encouraging the de-
velopment of a number of key financial innovations, such as the creation
of the world’s first stock exchange.9  In addition to supporting innovation,
this governmental support also contributed to the city developing a repu-
tation abroad as an efficient provider of various financial services that
were central to the international financial system during this period, in-
cluding trade financing and issuing loans to foreign governments.10 How-
ever, despite Amsterdam’s early emergence as an international financial
center, the city would come to be surpassed in prominence by London by
the end of the eighteenth century.11
The factor of trust helps illustrate how London began to overtake Am-
sterdam around the mid-eighteenth century.  During this time, London
gradually came to surpass Amsterdam as a central trading port in Eu-
rope,12 and, while London was still greatly lacking experience in executing
international financial transactions relative to Amsterdam, the increase in
commercial traffic to London brought with it a concomitant increase in the
volume of financial activity coming into the city. Moreover, during this
7. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 9.
8. See id.
9. See COISPEAU, supra note 6, at 106.
10. See PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 78 (1988).
11. See COISPEAU, supra note 6, at 115–117.
12. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 10.
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period, private bankers and traders began to realize that London
presented seemingly limitless growth opportunities in its financial sector,
while the financial sector of Amsterdam, by comparison, had been starting
to show signs of nearing the limits of its capacity.13 This perception led to
some financial institutions either establishing branch offices in London, or
moving their offices entirely from Amsterdam to London, including some
of the most prominent firms in Europe at that time.14  Beyond these shift-
ing perceptions among financial institutions, this migration of firms to
London brought critical business relationships within London’s financial
sector, while simultaneously depriving Amsterdam of those same relation-
ships that had departed. Furthermore, this migration effect was magnified
by the fact that, during this period, most banks and financial institutions
were family-owned, and these family-owners would often conduct most of
their business and financial activities through extensive interpersonal rela-
tionship channels that spanned out internationally.15Thus, as these family-
owned firms migrated from Amsterdam to London, so too did their exten-
sive interpersonal business networks.
Looking next at central banking and monetary policy, while the Am-
sterdam Wisselbank had emerged as arguably the first true central bank
during the city’s initial rise as a financial center,16 the London-based Bank
of England would eventually come to surpass it in terms of prominence
due to structural and functional advantages.  In terms of structural advan-
tages, the Bank of England was established as a joint-stock company, with
its directors beholden only to its private shareholders, while the Amster-
dam Wisselbank was beholden to various governmental entities and the
Dutch East India Company.17  In turn, the Bank of England’s joint-stock
company structure enabled the central bank to be far more responsive to
the changing economic and financial demands of its constituents relative
to the Amsterdam Wisselbank.18  As for functional advantages, the Bank
of England was also able to provide a greater range of services relative to
the Amsterdam Wisselbank.  For example, the Bank of England facilitated
the multilateral clearing of international payments between merchants,
which subsequently lead to the Bank of England surpassing the Amster-
13. See JOOST JONKER & KEETIE SLUYTERMAN, AT HOME ON THE WORLD MARKETS:
DUTCH INTERNATIONAL TRADING COMPANIES FROM THE 16TH CENTURY UNTIL THE PRE-
SENT 124 (2001).
14. See id.
15. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 38. These interpersonal relationship
channels would often arise from direct family relationships or religious affiliations.
16. See, Stephen Quinn & William Roberds, The Big Problem of Large Bills: The
Bank of Amsterdam and the Origins of Central Banking (Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, Working
Note No. 2005-16, 2005).
17. Ann M. Carlos & Larry Neal, Amsterdam and London as Financial Centers in the
Eighteenth Century, 18 FIN. HIST. REV. 21, 31–32 (2011).
18. See id. at 32.
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dam Wisselbank as a major clearing center within European payments
system.19
Monetary policy does not appear to have been as instrumental in the
transition. While there do not seem to be clear reasons for this phenome-
non, one possible explanation might be that the central banks of this era
were still relatively novel, and, as a result, these banks did not yet have
access to the range of influential monetary policy tools that modern cen-
tral banks come to possess as lenders of last resort.20  However, it is worth
noting that these early central banks, even without their modern monetary
policy tools, still played a key role in the rise of London over Amsterdam.
Though financial policy in the Netherlands had originally played a cru-
cial part in the emergence of Amsterdam as the first leading international
financial center, English financial policy would come to play a two-part
role in simultaneously promoting the position of London while undermin-
ing that of Amsterdam.  Considering first how English financial policy
worked to promote London, one of the most significant contributions of
English financial policy came through the establishment of a strong system
of public credit, which enabled domestic investors to invest and trade in a
rapidly growing amount of English sovereign debt and thereby bolstered
the overall strength of the English economy.21 The strength of the English
public credit system, in turn, was supported by the Bank of England,
which served as an efficient system through which long-term English sov-
ereign debt could be traded and repaid, and guarantees of such debt obli-
gations from Parliament, which were backed by Parliament’s power to
raise additional taxes from a relatively vast domestic reserve of taxable
wealth.22 English financial policy also promoted London through the abil-
ity of private bankers to lobby politicians for favorable regulatory treat-
ment.  This practice arose primarily because of the geographical proximity
of London’s financial market to the seat of English political power, which
enabled private bankers to establish and leverage close ties with
politicians.23
Considering second how English financial policy worked to undermine
the position of Amsterdam, the most overt English policy that targeted
Dutch financial activities was the auditing of Dutch investments in English
national funds, which had the effect of pressuring these investors to either
19. See MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW & POLICY 868 (2016)
(citing CHARLES GOODHART, THE EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL BANKS 5 (3d ed. 1981) and AN-
DREAS M. ANDREADES, HISTORY OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND 73 (4th ed. 2013)) (The Bank
of England also benefited from its political status as the English government’s preferred
bank, and its ability to “issue banknotes against the government’s debt and deal in bills of
exchange and gold or silver bullion.”); see also COISPEAU, supra note 6, at 138.
20. See BARR ET AL, supra note 19, at 868–70; CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at
45.
21. See COISPEAU, supra note 6, at 138; Kennedy, supra note 10, at 81.
22. See KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 80.
23. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 21.
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withdraw their holdings from, or conceal their holdings within, the English
financial sector.24 In addition, more indirect policies that undermined Am-
sterdam’s position came in the form of protectionist mercantile policies,
which had the effect of undermining the strength of Dutch trade,25 and
social policies that encouraged the resettlement of individuals, in particu-
lar Jewish individuals, from Amsterdam to London.26  While on a surface
level these indirect policies appeared to be designed to direct forms of
activity toward London that were not explicitly related to finance, the an-
cillary effect in redirecting trade flow and shifting interpersonal networks
to London nonetheless brought significant benefits to the city’s financial
sector at Amsterdam’s expense.
One final point regarding state financial policy is that, during this pe-
riod, the Dutch government also underwent its own shift in attempting to
overcome the challenges that were facing Amsterdam’s financial sector.
For example, the Dutch government created new supportive institutions
such as the Associatie Cassa, which was the country’s first joint-stock
bank, and the Bank of the Netherlands, which was modeled after the Bank
of England.27 However, rather than being created with a focus on
strengthening Amsterdam’s position in international finance, these new in-
stitutions were instead created with a focus on the Dutch domestic econ-
omy.28  Some have argued that this kind of inward shift in state financial
policy, from focusing on international markets to domestic ones, is a typi-
cal characteristic of an international financial center in decline.29
Lastly, stability played a catalytic role in London surpassing Amster-
dam.  Specifically, the disparate effects of a series of wars on Amsterdam
and London created a leadership vacuum within the international financial
system, which London readily filled.  With respect to Amsterdam, the ef-
fects of the Anglo-Dutch wars and the Napoleonic wars, both individually
and in the aggregate, were devastating to the city’s status as an interna-
tional financial center and served to hasten the city’s decline in promi-
nence.  With respect to the Anglo-Dutch wars, these initially began as a
result of the English mercantilist protectionist trade policies that at-
tempted to hamper Dutch trading supremacy.30  Eventually, however,
these wars would culminate in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, where the
Dutch navy suffered a humiliating defeat, and subsequently left the
24. See COISPEAU, supra note 6, at 116.
25. See id. at 114–15.
26. See id. at 115.
27. CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 14.
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., id. This policy shift toward focusing on the Dutch domestic economy was
not exclusive to the governmental institutions of the Netherlands, either. In fact, during this
period the number of firms involved in domestic trade increased substantially relative to the
number of international banking houses and merchant firms. See id.
30. See COISPEAU, supra note 6, at 114.
Spring 2018] Factors and Application 291
Netherlands on the verge of civil war.31 The aftermath of the Fourth An-
glo-Dutch War also led to an economic crisis in the Netherlands that fur-
ther undermined the strength of Amsterdam as a financial center.  During
this economic crisis, the Amsterdam Wisselbank, in an effort to salvage
the near-failing Dutch East India Company, supplied the company with
large advances under the direction of the city authorities of Amsterdam.32
However, these advances were made in violation of the Wisselbank’s char-
ter, and when news of this violation leaked to the public the credit value of
Wisselbank instruments plummeted, subsequently leading to a run on the
bank by foreign depositors.33 However, despite the devastating effects of
these earlier events, the true death-knell for Amsterdam as the leading
international financial center came about when the Napoleon invaded the
Netherlands, thus beginning the period of French occupation.  During the
occupation, Amsterdam lost a substantial portion of its market share in
financing international trade and issuing foreign loans, which the city was
unable to recover even after the occupation had ended.34
By contrast, the same conflicts that undermined Amsterdam’s position
provided London with substantial benefits and strengthened its position as
an international financial center.  With respect to the Anglo-Dutch wars,
England benefitted both from the reduction of the Dutch’s overall trading
capacity and the economic crisis that subsequently came to devastate the
Netherlands.  For example, many assets were moved directly from Am-
sterdam to London in the run that began after foreign investors discovered
the Wisselbank’s illicit advances to the failing Dutch East India Com-
pany.3536  In addition, the Napoleonic Wars benefitted London’s status as
a financial center since, on a more general level, the French military’s pol-
icy of wealth and property seizure prompted mainland European nobles to
move their assets to England as a safe harbor.37 Lastly, the French occupa-
tion of the Netherlands completed the rise-and-fall cycle between Amster-
dam and London since, with Amsterdam unable to continue efficiently
providing financial services during the occupation, many European states
had no choice but to turn to London when seeking to engage in interna-
tional financial transactions.38
31. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 19; JONKER & SLUYTERMAN, supra
note 13, at 125.
32. See JONKER & SLUYTERMAN, supra note 13, at 125.
33. See id.
34. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 12.
35. See JONKER & SLUYTERMAN, supra note 13, at 125.
36. See id.
37. See COISPEAU, supra note 6, at 117.
38. Id. at 116–17; see also CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 20.
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B. Exploring the Factors Contours–London versus Paris
After the fall of Amsterdam, London remained the leading interna-
tional financial center until New York surpassed it after the Second World
War.39  However, while no other financial centers were able to surpass
London prior to the Second World War, there were some noteworthy de-
velopments among other financial centers.  Two episodes in particular, the
unsuccessful attempt of Paris to overtake London as the leading interna-
tional financial center and Berlin’s successful overtaking of Frankfurt as
the leading regional financial center in the German states, merit further
consideration, as they provide valuable insight into the contours and limi-
tations of the factors put forward in this Note. In this section, this Note
will analyze the factors in the context of the unsuccessful attempt of Paris
to overtake London.  In the next section, this Note will analyze the factors
in the context of Berlin’s successful overtaking of Frankfurt.
Beyond being the only other serious attempt by another international
financial center to overtake London prior to New York’s rise in the early-
to-mid-twentieth century,40 Paris’s unsuccessful attempt to overtake
London provides an interesting perspective on the factors. Specifically, it
helps to illuminate both the limits of the factors as well as how the compo-
nent elements of the factors interact with one another. What makes Paris’s
unsuccessful attempt interesting is how, at first glance, the city appeared to
have acquired a number of advantages that implicated the factors. How-
ever, due to other factors at play during this period, Paris was unable to
surpass London before its own series of crises hit and ended its chances of
becoming the leading international financial center.
First, with respect to trust, Paris managed to match and eventually
overtake London as a major exporter of capital, hub for foreign exchange,
and international clearing center.41 While there were some significant non-
financial economic factors behind Paris’s ability to assume these leading
roles, the two principal financial elements fueling these developments
were France’s trade relationships with England and other European na-
tions and the trust foreign parties had in the strength of the franc.  Consid-
ering first France’s trade relationships, during this period France occupied
a unique position in that it was the only nation in Europe that had both
unfavorable trade balances with most European nations and a favorable
trade balance with England.42 Since most other European nations had un-
favorable trade balances with England or had become debtors to France
due to its rising prominence in the foreign loan market, Paris was able to
39. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 143.
40. See, e.g., id. at 60–61 (noting the rareness, in general, of periods during which two
or more financial centers competed for the position of the leading international financial
center).
41. See id. at 62–63; ALAIN PLESSIS, When Paris Dreamed of Competing with the
City . . ., in LONDON AND PARIS AS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRES IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 42–43 (Youssef Cassis & Éric Bussière eds., 2005).
42. See PLESSIS, supra note 41, at 42–43.
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leverage its unique position to become a major clearing center for settle-
ments within Europe.43  Although also related to central banking and
monetary policy, the confidence that foreign nations and investors had in
the franc during this period contributed greatly to Paris’s rise in promi-
nence as an international financial center. Most notably, for example, for-
eign nations that borrowed in Paris’s financial sector would often index
their currency to the franc as a way to attract French investors.44
However, despite Paris’s rise to prominence in some fields of interna-
tional finance, during the mid-nineteenth century the relative strength of
most international financial centers relied more heavily upon the volume
of their trading activities and market connectivity; and, in the field of in-
ternational trade, London still vastly outstripped Paris in terms of both
prestige and connectivity.45 In part, London’s superiority in international
trade was due to the fact that Paris’s landlocked position significantly
hampered its ability to effectively compete against London in trade.46 By
not being able to effectively compete with London, Paris’s efforts to over-
take London were significantly undermined because the areas of interna-
tional finance where Paris was able to compete with, and even surpass,
London did not implicate the area of finance upon which the strength of
London’s financial sector primarily relied. Compared to when London
overtook Amsterdam, where London’s encroachment into various areas of
finance that had previously dominated by Amsterdam had the additional
effect of undermining the strength of the Dutch financial sector, Paris’s
encroachment into the areas of capital exportation, foreign exchange, and
settlement clearing lacked the same negative impact with respect to the
strength of London’s financial sector, and instead merely created a divi-
sion of labor between the two centers.47
Central banking and monetary policy also favored Paris due to the
strength of the French central bank, the Banque de France, and, as men-
tioned above, the perceived strength of the franc. The Banque de France
provided Paris’s financial sector with significant competitive advantages
through its large specie reserves, which had been amassed in part because
of a hoarding policy within the bank itself, and in part because of France’s
“invisible export surplus” from activities like tourism, capital inflows, in-
come from such capital, and profits from various service industries.48
Through these vast specie reserves and the central bank’s policies regard-
ing their usage, the Banque de France enabled Paris to become the leading
center for liquidity regulation in the international financial system.49 In
43. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 64.
44. See id. (noting how nations like Austria-Hungary and Spain adopted monetary
units linked to the franc).
45. See id. at 61.
46. See id. at 62.
47. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 63.
48. See id. at 64–65; Plessis, supra note 41, at 44.
49. See Plessis, supra note 41, at 44–45.
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addition, these specie reserves buttressed the perceived strength of the
franc by improving the currency’s stability, reliability, and convertibility
through substantial gold-backing.50 Lastly, due in large part to how Paris’s
unique trading position in Europe enabled the city to become a major
international clearing center, the franc was also adopted by other nations
as a “continental reserve and settlement currency” in Europe, which fur-
ther strengthened Paris’s position as a financial center.51
While these elements helped to strengthen Paris’s position within the
international financial system, they were not sufficient to elevate Paris
above London. For one, the Banque de France, despite being a key inter-
national liquidity provider, appeared to be at best on par with the Bank of
England in terms of importance in the international financial system be-
cause the Bank of England held equally massive reserves of specie relative
to the Banque de France, and, unlike the Banque de France, also had the
ability to draw in vast sums of foreign capital as needed.52 Moreover, in
terms of relative currency strength, the pound sterling maintained a signif-
icant edge over the franc in that, despite the franc’s perceived strength, the
pound nevertheless retained its status as the primary currency for settle-
ments within the international payments system.53 The closest the franc
came to overtaking the pound sterling as a leading currency was when
France introduced the Latin Monetary Union initiative, which sought to
bring about the creation of a universal currency based on the franc.54 Had
this union been widely accepted in Europe, the franc could have poten-
tially surpassed the pound sterling as a leading currency. However, despite
some countries initially supporting the initiative, the plan to expand the
union’s membership gradually lost momentum and was eventually termi-
nated after England refused to join.55
Intermingling with the prior two factors, state financial policy perme-
ates through many of the elements that enabled Paris to challenge
London’s position. This was largely because of a prevailing political cli-
mate in France that strongly encouraged the development of the financial
sector of Paris, ideally to a level where it would be able to surpass
London.56 For example, certain significant policy decisions of the Banque
de France, such as its specie hoarding policy, were politically inspired, and
yielded valuable benefits for Paris’s financial sector, such as increased cur-
rency stability and prominence as an international liquidity provider, as
mentioned above.57 Other politically-backed initiatives included the initia-
50. See id. at 45.
51. See id. at 42.
52. See id. at 45; CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 65.
53. See Plessis, supra note 41, at 45; A.S.J. Baster, The International Acceptance Mar-
ket, 27 AM. ECON. REV. 294, 294 (1937).
54. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 65.
55. See id. at 65–67.
56. See id. at 64; Plessis, supra note 41, at 43.
57. See Plessis, supra note 41, at 44–45.
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tive for an expanded Latin Monetary Union, as well as the adoption of
various deregulatory policies in the French securities market as part of an
attempt to attract greater investment activity to Paris.58 However, these
state financial policies, at most, only managed to bring Paris close the level
of London, and were not sufficient to enable Paris to overtake it. Further-
more, some contemporary commentators were skeptical as to how much
stability these politically motivated policies actually provided Paris’s finan-
cial sector. Specifically, these skeptics believed that the high degree of po-
litical involvement made the position of Paris’s financial sector far more
volatile, while London, by contrast, enjoyed greater financial stability due
to its relative independence from political involvement and, instead, its
greater reliance on commerce.59
Lastly, perhaps the most important factor regarding why Paris was un-
able to surpass London was stability. While London was able to surpass
Amsterdam in the wake of the Anglo-Dutch wars and the Napoleonic
wars, there was no such destabilizing element of war to bolster Paris’s ef-
forts to overtake London. Moreover, while the Banque de France’s vast
specie reserves provided Paris with a great degree of economic stability
and likely enabled it to weather economic shocks during this period better
than London may have been able to, any impacts London might have suf-
fered from such shocks were likely mitigated significantly because the
Banque de France would often provide the Bank of England with critical
liquidity support during these economic shocks.60 Instead, the defeat of
the French army in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 caused a series of
destabilizing events that impacted the Parisian financial sector and under-
mined its position in the international financial system.61 For example, fol-
lowing France’s defeat, the Banque de France was obligated to suspend
convertibility and payments of specie for eight years, which had the two-
part effect of both reducing Paris’s former position as the leading interna-
tional liquidity regulator and also shifting a greater volume of interna-
tional payments transactions to London.62 Furthermore, in order to
finance the war indemnity demanded by Germany, France was required to
liquidate a substantial portion of its portfolio of foreign securities, thereby
limiting the nation’s ability to continue operating as a major capital ex-
porter and, in turn, further ceding Paris’s international financial market
share to London.63
58. See id. at 43; CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 64.
59. See, e.g., WALTER BAGSHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY
MARKET 34 (1896) (“The pre-eminence of Paris partly arose from a distribution of political
power, which is already disturbed; but that of London depends on the regular course of
commerce, which is singularly stable and hard to change.”).
60. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 108 (noting the self-interested motiva-
tions the Banque de France had for providing such liquidity support to the Bank of England);
Plessis, supra note 41, at 45.
61. See id. at 43.
62. See id.; Bagshot, supra note 59, at 32–34.
63. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 67; Plessis, supra note 41, at 43.
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C. Exploring the Factors Contour–Frankfurt to Berlin
Berlin’s successful overtaking of Frankfurt as the leading financial
center in the German states is unique in that it does not actually involve a
rise-and-fall cycle among leading international financial centers; rather,
the cycle occurs entirely within a single country.  The unique intrastate
context of this cycle is instructive because it sheds a different light on the
relative roles played by each of the factors that would be harder to discern
in an international cycle. For example, compared to the rise-and-fall cycles
between Amsterdam and London or Paris and London, where the element
of war had a profound and catalytic impact, stability plays a much more
muted role in Berlin’s overtaking of Frankfurt. Rather, the factor carrying
the most significance in this case is that of state financial policy and, more
specifically, the element of political influence. Considering how the factors
may manifest in future rise-and-fall cycles among leading international fi-
nancial centers post-Brexit, the case of Berlin’s overtaking of Frankfurt
may provide useful insight as to how intragovernmental politics, such as
those in a body like the European Union, might influence where an ascen-
dant financial center emerges.
First, to briefly address stability, prior to Berlin surpassing Frankfurt as
a financial center, there had been a relatively lengthy unification process
among the individual German states that culminated in the Franco-Prus-
sian War of 1870.64 However, unlike the wars that had previously served
as catalysts in the cases of London surpassing Amsterdam and Paris failing
to surpass London, there was almost no substantial economic fallout to
one or the other’s benefit or detriment. Rather, the Franco-Prussian War
arguably brought both centers increased stability through the formation of
the newly unified German state.65 Despite Berlin and Frankfurt likely
benefitting from this increased stability, the political consequences of Ger-
man unification would eventually come to significantly undermine Frank-
furt’s position as a financial center while simultaneously promoting
Berlin’s.
During this period financial policy in Germany was largely dominated
by Prussia, which used its dominant influence to promote Berlin as Ger-
many’s primary financial center over Frankfurt. From a purely political
standpoint, this favoritism was due in no small part to Berlin being both
the capital of both Prussia and the newly unified German state. However,
this favoritism also appeared to be due in part to Frankfurt’s own political
leanings prior to German unification, which had been in tension with Prus-
sian political interests. Accompanying the relocation of the political capital
of Germany, there were also corresponding efforts to relocate the German
economic and financial capitals to Berlin as well.66 Some notable points of
64. See Charles P. Kindleberger, The Formation of Financial Centers: A Study in Com-
parative Economic History, in PRINCETON STUDIES IN INT’L FINANCE 24 (no. 36, 1998).
65. See id. at 27–28.
66. One contemporary during this period, Georg von Siemens, who was the general
manager of newly founded Deutsche Bank, noted the importance of Berlin post-unification,
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tension between the viewpoints of the Frankfurt and Prussia were in their
respective relationships with Austria, and in their views on financial inter-
est-alignment with Paris and London, as the other major financial centers
of this period. Specifically, while Frankfurt had maintained close relations
with Austria and leaned towards aligning its financial interests with Paris,
Prussia had fought and defeated Austria during the German unification
process in the Austro-Prussian War in 1866 and chose instead to align its
financial interests with London.67 As a result, the post-unification political
dynamic in Germany, largely dominated by Prussian interests, was one
which both favored Berlin and disfavored Frankfurt, and this dynamic
also played a significant role in determining how the remaining factors of
trust and central banking and monetary policy played out.
Beginning with trust, while Berlin was by no means a brand new finan-
cial center, prior to German unification Frankfurt had significantly out-
stripped Berlin in terms of financial sector experience and international
relationships.68 However, once the shift in political backing towards Berlin
had occurred, individuals began to redirect their business to Berlin in a
substantial way, which had negative impacts on even the largest private
banks in Frankfurt.69 Beyond this redirection of activity due to political
favoritism, there were also other elements of a perceived trust difference
that gave Berlin an even greater advantage over Frankfurt. For example,
during this period there was a perception among individual clients that the
bankers of Berlin possessed greater “nimbleness and skill” than their
counterparts in Frankfurt, which likely contributed in part to the afore-
mentioned migration of clientele.70 Furthermore, around this time the in-
ternational financial system developed an interest in industrial securities,
particularly railroad issuances.71 This preference weighed in favor of Ber-
lin’s financial sector, as the city had prior experience in managing indus-
trial securities from before the unification of the German states, while
Frankfurt’s financial sector, by comparison, had continued to focus on for-
eign government loans and state security issuances.72 Thus, Berlin, having
been more forward-looking and innovative in its development of experi-
as evidenced by “the eagerness with which the Frankfurt capital market [came] to meet [Ber-
lin].” See id. (citing KARL HELFFERICH, GEORG VON SIEMENS, EIN LEBENSBILD AUS
DEUTSCHLANDS GROSSER ZEIT 34 (1956)).
67. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 71.
68. See id. at 71–72.
69. See Kindleberger, supra note 64, at 27 (citing HELMUT BÖHME, DEUTSCHLANDS
WEG ZUR GROSSMACHT, STUDIEN ZUM VERHALTNIS VON WIRTSCHAFT UND STAAT WIIH-
REND DER REICHSGRIINDERZEIT, 1848-1881 219 (1966)).
70. See id. (citing Helfferich, supra note 66, at 27).
71. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 54–55 (briefly overviewing the railway
finance boom in international finance).
72. See Kindleberger, supra note 64, at 27 (citing BERNHARD BROCKHAGE, ZUR
ENTWICKLUNG DES PREUSSISCH-DEUTSCHEN KAPITALEXPORTS, ERSTER TEIL, DER BER-
LINER MARKT FAR AUSLANDISCHE STAATSPAPIERE, 1816 HIS ZUM 1840 56 (1910)); see also
CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 72.
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ence in the issuance of industrial securities, was in a better position to
capture this shift in activity within the international financial system, while
Frankfurt, having been more backward-looking in its continued reliance
on foreign loans, fell behind.
Looking lastly at central banking and monetary policy, the political el-
ement of state financial policy also tipped the balance in favor of Berlin.
The primary way in which the factor of central banking and monetary pol-
icy manifested during this transition was in the establishment of the Ger-
man monetary union, which brought about the establishment of a central
bank, the Reichsbank, in Berlin, and the adoption of the mark as a com-
mon currency within Germany.73 With respect to the Reichsbank, the
structure of the bank, in particular, evidenced a high degree of political
favoritism, as the bank’s supervisory board was chaired by the chancellor
of the Reich, whose directives were then binding on the chair of the execu-
tive board.74 Moreover, of the fifteen-member central committee which
represented the shareholders of the Reichsbank, nine members were re-
quired to be residents of Berlin.75 On a more general level, however, the
adoption of both of these measures through the German monetary union
had the effect of depriving Frankfurt of its own monetary autonomy,
which the city had previously enjoyed prior to the unification of the Ger-
man states.76 Thus, all of the factors, as influenced by this element of polit-
ical influence, enabled Berlin to overtake Frankfurt as the leading
financial center in Germany. Furthermore, Berlin would retain this posi-
tion until the end of the Second World War, when Frankfurt would
reemerge as the financial capital of West Germany.77
D. London to New York
Returning to analyzing the rise-and-fall cycles among leading interna-
tional financial centers, as mentioned above, London retained its position
as the leading center until the mid-twentieth century when New York rose
to overtake it. New York’s rise has a number of unique features that help
to illustrate the evolution of the factors put forth in this Note. For one, the
international financial system in which this rise-and-fall cycle unfolded was
far more globalized than it had been during London’s rise over a century
73. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 71; U.S. Senate Nat’l Monetary
Comm., 61st Cong., THE REICHSBANK: 1876–1900 43–46 (1910), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
files/docs/historical/nmc/nmc_408_1910.pdf.
74. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 71. While this evidence of fairly direct
political favoritism was present in the structure of the Reichsbank, the bank was still struc-
tured as a private organization. See id. at 72 n.128.
75. See id. at 72 n.128.
76. See id. at 72.
77. See Kindleberger, supra note 64, at 24.
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earlier.78 Specifically, international trade, and the financing thereof, had
become even more critical as a source of activity within financial centers,
and the growth of foreign investments and free movement of capital had
begun to hint at the emergence of a truly international capital market sys-
tem.79 Moreover, as discussed in greater detail below, the factor of stabil-
ity began to undergo a transformation of its own, as the impact of
economic crises began to take on a more prominent role in catalyzing cy-
cles. As noted above in discussing the rise of London over Amsterdam and
Paris’s failed attempt at surpassing London, the impact of economic crises
on the rise-and-fall cycles among the leading international financial cen-
ters, while critical, often played a secondary role to the impact of wars.
This disparity in impact was largely due to the fact that these early eco-
nomic crises were often a direct byproduct or knock-on effect of a war’s
aftermath rather than standalone events. However, during the rise-and-fall
cycle between New York and London, while the relative position of the
New York’s financial sector was undoubtedly furthered by the devastating
effects that both the First and Second World Wars had on London’s finan-
cial sector, the destabilizing effects of the Great Depression also had a
substantial impact on the rate at which the city would surpass London.
Had it not been for the occurrence of the Great Depression, New York
might have surpassed London as an international financial center in the
years following the First World War, assuming it had not done so al-
ready;80 but, because of the Depression, the rise of New York would ulti-
mately be delayed until after the conclusion of the Second World War.
In analyzing how New York came to overtake London, the role of trust
for New York parallels its role during London’s rise to prominence over
Amsterdam. One parallel is how the New York financial market initially
developed as a means to accommodate the city’s commercial and trading
markets.81 Where New York’s rise distinguishes itself from London with
respect to this parallel, though, is that, while both cities were handling a
substantial volume of international transactions at this time, New York
proved more successful in drawing and managing foreign investment into
the United States’ economy.82 This distinction arose during the early
twentieth century, as the United States experienced rapid growth in its
economy while it simultaneously developed into a major capital im-
78. See generally CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 41–42, 74–81 (providing an
overview of the developments in the global economy that had taken place over the course of
the 20th century).
79. See id. at 74–77, 131.
80. See Hugh Rockoff, Until It’s Over, Over There: The U.S. Economy in World War I
20–21 (NBER Working Note No. 10580, June 2004).
81. This Note will not explore the development of the New York financial center, gen-
erally, as that would go well beyond the scope of its topic. However, for background on why
New York emerged as the primary financial center for the United States, see, e.g., R.G. AL-
BION, THE RISE OF NEW YORK PORT (1815–1860) (1939); see also Kindleberger, supra note
64, at 52–56.
82. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 160.
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porter.83 As the leading financial center within the United States, New
York was thus able to take on a role as the primary gateway for foreign
capital being invested into the United States’ economy.84 However, in ad-
dition to being a major capital import center, New York would also come
to surpass London as a major capital export center because of increased
public investment in foreign stocks, supported by the experience and inter-
national connections of New York’s financial institutions.85 With respect
to these connections, for example, the founders of some of New York’s
most prestigious financial institutions had extensive interpersonal relation-
ships with foreign financial centers and vast experience in international
finance, much to the city’s benefit.86 Beyond these elements of relation-
ships and experience, the international market connections of New York
were broadened further as more foreign banks sought to establish a foot-
hold within the city during the early twentieth century, with a focus on
international trade financing.87 Eventually, the development of these fi-
nancial institutions, both domestic and foreign, would lead to New York
coming to host a substantial range of specialist financial firms, which may
be viewed by some as a typical characteristic of a large international finan-
cial center.88 As a final point regarding trust, and related to stability, the
First World War significantly improved the overall perception of New
York as an international financial center equal, if not superior, to London.
This shift in perception was largely due to London’s weakened economic
state relative to New York in the wake of the War.89 However, because of
the Great Depression, and also to a lesser extent because of New York’s
lack of experience as an international financial center, New York’s rise
above London would not occur until after the Second World War.90
Looking next at central banking and monetary policy, New York’s rise
in prominence was significantly impacted by the role of the Federal Re-
83. See id. at 114–15, 204.
84. See id. at 114.
85. See id. at 155.
86. See id. at 115–18. J.P. Morgan and his namesake bank, J.P. Morgan & Co., could
be considered exemplars of this phenomenon, as J.P. Morgan had connections with to
London and Paris financial markets through partnerships he held at J.S. Morgan & Co. and
Morgan, Harjes & Cie (positions which he, in turn, had inherited from his father). See id. at
117 (citing KATHLEEN BURK, MORGAN GRENFELL 1838–1988: THE BIOGRAPHY OF A
MERCHANT BANK 62 (1990)).
87. See MIRA WILKINS, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1914–1945 274 (2009). The particular focus of these institutions on international
trade was due in part to state and federal laws that prohibited foreign banks from taking
retail deposits, and requirements that all directors of a national bank be citizens of the
United States. See Barr et al., supra note 19, at 722.
88. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 205.
89. See Rockoff, supra note 80, at 21.
90. See Coispeau, supra note 6, at 154–55.
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serve System.91 On a fundamental level, the creation of the Federal Re-
serve System in 1913, and in particular the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, was a boon for New York, as the city’s financial institutions came to
have the backing of a lender of last resort.92 Moreover, the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York came to occupy a unique role within the sphere
of international finance, due in no small part to the efforts of its first presi-
dent, Benjamin Strong. In particular, early on, Strong worked to develop
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s ties to foreign central banks,
aided by his connections with then-governor of the Bank of England,
Montagu Norman.93 In addition, Strong was responsible for pioneering
the monetary policy technique of open market operations, which signifi-
cantly increased the stability of the United States economy by enabling the
Federal Reserve to regulate liquidity and credit availability.94 Over time,
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s international connections and
prominence would continue to grow until eventually, by the end of the
Second World War, it came to assume the responsibilities of being both
the United States’ primary correspondent bank in dealing with foreign
central banks and governments and for managing the U.S. Treasury’s and
other Federal Reserve banks’ foreign exchange and transfer operations.95
By contrast, the role of the Bank of England within the international fi-
nancial system would diminish substantially from its pre-1914 status, when
it was regarded as the primary coordinator among world central banks,96
largely due to the weakening of the pound sterling.
The Bank of England took key steps to increase its regulatory author-
ity as means to promote stability and counter the detrimental effects of the
First World War.97 However, despite these efforts the weakening of the
pound sterling nonetheless undermined London’s financial sector, largely
because the strength of the pound as an international reserve currency had
91. This Note will not explore the development of the Federal Reserve System, gener-
ally, as that would go well beyond the scope of its topic. However, for background on how
the Federal Reserve System came to be developed, see Barr et al., supra note 19, at 42–47.
92. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 124.
93. See id. at 124, 157.
94. See LIQUAT AHAMED, LORDS OF FINANCE: THE BANKERS WHO BROKE THE
WORLD 170–71 (2009); see also Barr et al., supra note 19, at 873–74 (explaining the role and
mechanics of open market operations in monetary policy).
95. See id. at 205. While there were a number of factors that contributed to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York occupying such a prominent position within the Federal Reserve
System, a key turning point that arguably cemented New York as the monetary and financial
heart of the United States was occurred in 1942 when the president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York was made a permanent member of the Federal Open Market Committee.
See 12 U.S.C. § 263; (originally enacted as Act of July 7, 1942, ch. 488, § 263, 49 Stat. 705); see
also Michele Fratianni, The Evolutionary Chain of International Financial Centers 26 (Oct.
2007) (unpublished manuscript) (citing ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE, VOLUME 1: 1913–1951 599 (2003)). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1006590.
96. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 82–83.
97. See id. at 164–65.
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been one of the key foundations supporting London’s position as the lead-
ing international financial center.98 In particular, during the First World
War England was forced to suspend the pound sterling’s convertibility to
gold due to the fact that the international gold standard system had ceased
to function at the onset of hostilities.99 While the pound sterling’s stability
was maintained during the war through both financial support from the
United States and index-linking the pound to the dollar, when American
financial support was ended after the War the pound’s exchange rate be-
gan to float, ushering in a period of relative “monetary chaos.”100 In an
effort to restore stability, England’s political leaders intervened in mone-
tary policy by reestablishing the pound sterling’s gold convertibility and
indexing the pound’s value to its pre-war parity, amid much contro-
versy.101 However, this political decision to reestablish pre-war parity gave
rise to a general perception that the pound sterling had become over-
valued, which subsequently led to a loss of confidence in the currency’s
true stability.102 This loss of confidence intensified in the wake of the
Great Depression, as the effects of the depression began to cascade into
the international financial system, and eventually triggered a bank run on
the Bank of England through an increase in the frequency of gold with-
drawals.103 Subsequent events of both political and financial turmoil accel-
erated these withdrawals until the English government was prompted to
intervene in monetary policy once more and suspend the pound sterling’s
gold convertibility.104 Though at this time London’s financial sector was
still suffering relatively more from the lingering effects of the First World
War, the English government’s move to abandon the gold standard so
quickly after having reestablished gold convertibility was the final step to-
wards breaking the market’s confidence in the stability of formerly-domi-
nant pound sterling.105 As time progressed, the dollar would come to
assume the pound sterling’s former role as an international reserve cur-
rency, and thereafter would play a fundamental role in establishing New
York’s position as the leading international financial center after the Sec-
ond World War, similar to how the pound had previously been fundamen-
tal in establishing London’s position.106
Moving next to the factor of state financial policy, as an initial matter,
one unique feature of New York that distinguishes it from London, Paris,
Amsterdam, and even Berlin is that the city is the first modern example of
a leading international financial center that is not also located within the
98. See id. at 184.
99. See id. at 152–53.
100. See id. at 153.
101. See id. at 162.
102. See id. at 184.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 184–85.
105. See id. at 185.
106. See id. at 204.
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political heart of its home nation. This difference was likely brought about
by a historical distrust of centralized government and banking within the
United States, which prompted a separation of the nation’s political and
financial centers.107 Furthermore, New York remains as the only example
of a leading international financial center that is not also the political heart
of its home nation, suggesting both the difficulty, yet possibility, that fu-
ture international financial centers that are not located in the political
heart of their home nation might also rise to similar prominence.
Considering more concrete state financial policy measures, the political
involvement of the English government in monetary policy, as discussed
above, contributed in part to undermining the strength of London as an
international financial center, despite the government’s likely well-inten-
tioned rationale for intervening. By comparison, state financial policy in
the United States would undergo a significant evolution during this period
as the federal government began to increase its role in regulating the na-
tion’s financial system as a means to increase stability and combat growing
abuses in the market.108 For one, the creation of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem through the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was a critical step towards
not only increasing the stability of the United States economy as a whole,
but also for strengthening New York’s position as an international finan-
cial center through the presence of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, as discussed above.109 Moreover, in the wake of the Great Depres-
sion, the New Deal’s financial reforms brought about another wave of in-
creased federal regulation in the United States’ financial system to
increase stability and transparency in the market.110 However, while these
financial policy choices benefitted New York as a financial center through
increased stability and transparency, these arguably were not the most sig-
nificant financial policies that would come to enable New York to surpass
London as an international financial center. Rather, the state financial pol-
icies that would come to enable New York to become the leading interna-
tional financial center were those dealing with the United States’ stance
towards assuming a true leadership role within the realm of international
finance.
Before and during the First World War, the political climate in the
United States was such that the nation was hesitant to fully commit itself
to the international financial system.111 This reluctance proved especially
107. See, e.g., Barr et al., supra note 19, at 32–37, 42–45 (describing, in historical con-
text, some of the political tensions that existed between those who advocated for a true cen-
tral bank and those who advocated for a more decentralized banking structure).
108. The expansion of the United States’ federal government’s role in financial regula-
tion during the early twentieth century represented a significant shift in the nature of state
financial policy within the United States. Though this Note will not explore the earlier history
of state financial policy within the United States, for an overview of this history, see id. at
32–41.
109. See id. at 42–45.
110. See id. at 47–52 (for an overview of some significant New Deal financial reforms).
111. See Kindleberger, supra note 64, at 61.
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problematic during the inter-war and post-war periods when circum-
stances became increasingly evident that England, with London as its fi-
nancial heart, could no longer serve as the leader of the international
financial system.112 Some scholars have even gone so far as to suggest that
the Great Depression was, at least in part, a consequence of this reluc-
tance by the “most promising candidate” for the position of the leading
international financial center, New York, to take responsibility from
London after it lost the capacity to continue its crucial role in serving the
needs of the international financial system.113 However, in the years
before, during, and after the Second World War, the United States increas-
ingly changed its political stance to embrace a greater willingness to as-
sume the mantle of leadership within the international financial system.114
Thus, compared to the United States’ previous reluctance, by the end of
the Second World War the United States, with New York as its financial
heart, was significantly involved with, and committed to, its leadership role
within the international financial system, evidenced in part by its central
involvement in the post-war Bretton Woods System.115
Though touched on in the discussion above regarding how the other
factors manifested during New York’s rise, the factor of stability main-
tained its crucial role as a catalyst during this cycle, albeit with some note-
worthy developments. Considering first similarities with past cycles, the
First and Second World Wars, like the Anglo-Dutch war and French occu-
pation during London’s previous rise, had a two-part effect of destabilizing
the former leading international financial center, London, while simulta-
neously providing the ascendant financial center, New York, with an op-
portunity to expand its influence abroad. Specifically, the World Wars
undermined the strength of London in that its capacity to serve the inter-
national financial system was substantially diminished,116 while New York,
backed by the United States’ strong domestic economy and central bank-
ing system, was able to step in and fill the leadership vacuum created by
London’s reduced capacity, albeit with some initial difficulties.117
Beyond these direct effects of the World Wars, perhaps a more inter-
esting aspect of New York’s rise above London is what appears to be a
shift in the importance of the element of economic crises in indicating how
112. See id.; see also CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION,
1929–1939 296–97 (1973).
113. See Kindleberger, supra note 64, at 61 (“[T]he 1929 Depression was the conse-
quence of an ineffective transition of the financial center from London to New York. No new
center rose to challenge the old ones and to wrest financial supremacy or responsibility from
them. Instead, in this instance an old center lost the capacity to serve as the center of the
world financial system, and the most promising candidate for the position was unwilling or
unable to fulfill the responsibilities.”).
114. See id.; CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 204.
115. See Michael S. Barr, Who’s in Charge of Global Finance?, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 971
976–77 (2014).
116. See Kindleberger, supra note 64, at 61.
117. See id.
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and when a shift in prominence might occur.  As touched on in the above
discussion, the Great Depression had a wide range of impacts on the way
in which this cycle unfolded, ranging from prompting certain regulatory
responses in both the United States and England, to outright delaying
New York eventual overtaking of London, despite the latter having a sig-
nificantly weakened position. Furthermore, compared to past economic
crises that influenced shifts among leading international financial centers,
such as those that resulted directly from the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in
the case of Amsterdam or from the Franco-Prussian War in the case of
Paris, the case for whether the Great Depression may be viewed as having
resulted directly from the First World War is much less clear.118 Rather,
there were a number of issues within the United States’ financial system
during this period, independent of the First World War, that also contrib-
uted significantly to the onset of the Great Depression; thus, suggesting
that the Depression should not be viewed as being a mere knock-on effect
of a preceding war.119 Following New York’s rise above London, this shift
towards economic crises having greater influence over the factor of stabil-
ity became much more apparent, particularly as the international financial
system became more globalized, while war took on a much less influential
role as the post-World War period began.
E. Exploring the Factors Contours–Tokyo versus New York
Before looking at the last significant rise-and-fall cycle among leading
international financial centers, when London reclaimed its former position
from New York, the case of Tokyo’s rise to prominence in the late twenti-
eth century as the first non-Western, modern international financial center
to vie for the leading center status merits consideration as a means to bet-
ter understand the nature of the factors. For one, the speed with which
Tokyo emerged as a possible candidate for the leading financial center
position was remarkable relative to that of the other leading international
financial centers, and was likely due in no small part to Japan’s latecomer
advantages.120 Moreover, the case of Tokyo is also interesting in that, dur-
118. One way in which this argument might be framed is that the Great Depression
resulted from New York failing to assume London’s role as the leading international financial
center, with London being unable to continue fulfilling its role as the leading international
financial center because of the detrimental effects the First World War had on the city’s
financial capabilities. See id.
119. For an overview of activities within the United States’ financial sector itself that
contributed to the onset of the Great Depression, see Barr et al., supra note 19, at 47–48.
120. Latecomer advantages are the economic benefits that developing economies bene-
fit have when catching up with more industrialized nations. These benefits can include the
“introduction of technology and process innovation” through importation and improved en-
gineering, the ability to avoid market risks by studying and adopting foreign business models,
and increased incentives for “innovation and quality control” as a result of competition with
foreign markets. See Shigeru T. Otsubo, Professor, Nagoya University, Post-War Develop-
ments of the Japanese Economy 15 (Apr. 2007),http://www.gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp/sotsubo/
Postwar_Development_of_the_Japanese%20Economy(Otsubo_NagoyaU).pdf.
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ing the peak of the city’s rise in the 1980s, some scholars had already be-
gun to perceive Tokyo as close to emerging as, if not already, the leading
international financial center,121 despite the fact that the factors did not
appear to significantly weigh against New York at the time. Underlying
Tokyo’s rapid rise and the perception of its financial supremacy, the fac-
tors appear to have manifested in unique ways, indicating how the factors
began to evolve following the Second World War. Furthermore, the case
of Tokyo also provides a potential blueprint for how a non-Western finan-
cial center in the developing world could perhaps rapidly rise to the posi-
tion of the leading international financial center in the future.
With respect to trust, during Tokyo’s rise the elements of market con-
nections, relationships, and experience all appeared to manifest in a some-
what similar manner to how they had manifested in previous cycles.
However, unlike these previous rise-and-fall cycles, the rate at which these
elements manifested in the case of Tokyo occurred at a blistering pace.
Starting with the element of market connections, Tokyo’s growth as a fi-
nancial center was largely supported by Japanese industry and the city’s
connections to a strong domestic economy, similar to how the financial
sectors of London and New York had developed earlier.122 Moreover, the
growth of Japanese industry after the Second World War was remarkable,
as in roughly thirty years the Japanese economy managed to rebuild itself
from near-total ruin to being one of the largest and fastest growing econo-
mies in the world.123 While Japan’s latecomer advantages likely contrib-
uted significantly to its rapid development, Japan also benefitted from the
fact that, despite the ruinous effects of the Second World War, it still had a
relatively well-established industrial infrastructure and a well-educated
population that was motivated to rebuild the nation.124 In addition, during
this post-war period, Japan was able to fully focus its national energies on
reconstruction and economic development over defense spending, due in
part to the protection arrangements it had with the United States.125 Thus,
under these circumstances, the Japanese economy was able to grow at a
rapid rate, and the benefits of this growth would subsequently be trans-
lated into advantages for Tokyo’s financial system, given the city’s central
role within the Japanese domestic economy.126
121. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 10, at 466 (likening Tokyo’s rise to the position of
the world’s “leading banking” center as following the earlier examples set by Amsterdam,
London, and New York); see also Kathleen Burk, Money and Power: The Shift from Great
Britain to the United States, in FINANCE AND FINANCIERS IN EUROPEAN HISTORY, 1880–1960
359 (Youssef Cassis ed., 1992) (noting that the US was slowly but surely being overtaken by
Japan as the world financial power).
122. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 238.
123. See Kennedy, supra note 10, at 416–18; Otsubo, supra note 120, at 4, 13.
124. See Kennedy, supra note 10, at 416–17.
125. See id. at 459; CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 239.
126. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 238–39.
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Beyond the support that Tokyo received from its connections to a
strong domestic economy, the factor of trust also appeared to manifest in
some new ways, as well. One example is that, with respect to market con-
nections, Tokyo was, to an extent, naturally situated to become a leading
financial center because of its geographic location, as the city was able to
serve as a time bridge between the financial markets North America and
Europe.127 Another example is that, with respect to the element of experi-
ence, while the Tokyo financial sector did not appear to benefit from an
established base of financial experience or an initial influx of foreign fi-
nancial institutions, the Japanese, inspired by the United States’ model of
finance, were nonetheless able to translate industrial market growth into
financial center growth through their own efforts.128 Even though in the
1980s many major foreign financial institutions would come to establish
branch offices in Tokyo, by this time the city’s financial sector was already
thriving, with five of Japan’s largest commercial banks then being re-
garded as ranking among the largest banks in the world.129 However,
while Tokyo’s ability to establish its own experienced financial sector base
without an influx of foreign talent is impressive, it is also worth noting that
the lag in foreign financial institutions branching into Japan was also
largely the result of strict regulatory controls over the flow of cross-border
capital and access to Tokyo’s financial sector.130
As an element of the factor of state financial policy, the Japanese gov-
ernment’s strict regulatory controls over financial activity played a major
role during the early phase of Tokyo’s rise. These regulatory controls were
so extensive that it would arguably be impossible to discuss the factor of
central banking and monetary policy independently from state financial
policy because of the nearly autocratic control the Ministry of Finance and
the Bank of Japan held over the Japanese financial system.131 For exam-
ple, during this period the Japanese government employed policies such as
artificially devaluing the yen and maintaining low interest rates in order to
fuel growth within the domestic economy, while simultaneously retaining
approval authority over almost all transactions involving capital flows en-
tering or exiting Japan.132 On the monetary policy side, the Bank of Japan
forwent open market operations, due in part to a lack of sovereign bonds
issuances as part of a balanced budget policy, in favor of the extensive use
127. See Coispeau, supra note 6, at 177. Of note, Tokyo also benefitted from its location
in its status as a major port city within Japan, similar to Amsterdam, London, and New York
before it.
128. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 238–39.
129. See id. at 238–41.
130. See Yusuke Kashiwagi, Chairman, Bank of Tokyo, The Emergence of Global Fi-
nance, The 1986 Per Jacobsson Lecture 7–8 (Sept. 28, 1986), http://www.perjacobsson.org/
lectures/1986.pdf.
131. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 239.
132. See Kennedy, supra note 10, at 459; Kashiwagi, supra note 130, at 7; CAPITALS OF
CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 239.
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of its discount rate, loans, and “window guidance” to commercial banks.133
Through this policy framework, the Bank of Japan was able to exercise a
high degree of control over the extent to which Japanese commercial
banks could issue loans by reducing or increasing its own loans to those
banks, which effectively enabled the Bank of Japan to regulate the volume
of all Japanese economic activity.134 By the 1970s, however, the Japanese
government, under pressure from an economic slowdown, gradually began
to relax its regulatory policies, thereby opening Tokyo’s financial sector to
more liberal and increased international activity.135
While a high degree of governmental control was a defining feature
during the earlier phase of Tokyo’s rise, after the Japanese government
began to liberalize and deregulate its financial sector, Tokyo’s role in the
international capital market system and the strength of the yen would de-
velop into defining features of the city as an international financial center.
First, with respect to Tokyo’s role in the international capital market sys-
tem, the city was widely viewed as a major capital exporter but not so
much as a major capital importer.136 In line with these views, Tokyo’s fi-
nancial sector became a significant source of financing for foreign individ-
uals, especially through the ability of Tokyo-based financial institutions to
engage in maturity transformations by taking in short-term capital invest-
ments and issuing long-term loans in return.137 The sustained growth of
the Japanese economy also fueled the rise of the yen as a key currency
within the international monetary system.138 While for a time there was
some speculation that Japan could surpass the United States as a key cur-
rency nation, there was also the belief that Japan still lacked the potential
to accomplish such a feat, and, instead, would take on a supplementary
role within a burgeoning multi-key currency system.139 Over time, the lat-
ter of these two views would be proven more or less correct, as the yen
would assume a role as the third leading international currency alongside
the dollar and the euro.140
Stability, relative to the other factors, played a much more critical role
during Tokyo’s rise because of the double-edged manner in which it mani-
fested. On the strengthening edge, in an interesting development, the ele-
ment of war was both present and arguably had a beneficial impact on
Tokyo’s initial growth as a financial center. While the effects of the Second
World War had left much of Japan and its economy in ruin, the subsequent
reconstruction efforts had a significant impact in mitigating the long-term
damaging effects of the war, and thus enabled Japanese industry to begin
133. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 239.
134. See id.
135. See Kashiwagi, supra note 130, at 8.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 9.
138. See id. at 10.
139. See id.
140. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 268.
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its rapid rise.141 Moreover, Japanese industry also benefitted significantly
from increased defense spending by the United States during the Korean
War, which further stimulated growth among Japanese export indus-
tries.142 However, aside from these strengthening benefits, the element of
war did not have much of an impact on Tokyo’s rise as an international
financial center, or, on a more general level, Japan’s rise as an economic
power, especially when contrasted with the detrimental effects that had
accompanied previous manifestations of this element. Rather, the element
of economic crises, which came to manifest through the Japanese real es-
tate and stock market bubbles bursting, had a much more profoundly det-
rimental effect on Tokyo’s rise by halting the tremendous momentum that
Tokyo had built up towards overtaking New York.143
The Japanese real estate and stock market bubbles arose because of
substantial expansions within the Japanese credit markets and rising asset
prices after the government implemented deregulatory policies that liber-
alized and opened the Japanese financial sector to increased international
activity.144 Moreover, while state financial policies triggered the initial for-
mation of the bubbles, their expansion was perpetuated by a feedback
loop where higher asset prices and expansions of credit came to be sup-
ported by a general anticipation among actors within the Japanese finan-
cial sector of further asset price and credit increases.145 By 1990, however,
when the Governor of the Bank of Japan intervened in the Japanese finan-
cial sector to tighten credit availability, out of concern regarding the con-
trol of inflation, this expansionary loop that had fed the growth of the
market bubbles was cut off, subsequently leading to the bubbles burst-
ing.146 In the aftermath, the Japanese real estate and stock markets exper-
ienced a sharp decline in value, and growth rates within the national
economy have since been only slightly positive or negative—a far cry from
the robust expansion witnessed during Tokyo’s initial rise to
prominence.147
In some respects, the bursting of the real estate and stock market bub-
bles in Japan parallels how the Great Depression hampered New York’s
141. See Kennedy, supra note 10, at 418.
142. See id.
143. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 268–70.
144. See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Bubbles and Crises, 110 ECON. J. 236, 236–37
(2000). For perspective, in the stock markets, the Nikkei 225 index rose from around 10,000
in 1985 to 38,916 in 1989 before the bubble burst. See id. at 237. In the real estate markets,
the few hundred acres in Tokyo where the Imperial Palace is located were valued in 1989 at a
price roughly equivalent to all of the land in California. See Jeffrey A. Frankel, The Japanese
Financial System and the Cost of Capital, in JAPANESE CAPITAL MARKETS: NEW DEVELOP-
MENTS IN REGULATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS 21–77 (Shinji Takagi ed., 1993) (citing Jeffrey
Sachs & Peter Boone, Japanese Structural Adjustment and Balance of Payments (NBER
Working Note No. 2614, June 1988)).
145. See Allen & Douglas, supra note 144, at 247.
146. See id. at 236–37, 247.
147. See id. at 237.
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earlier rise above London. However, unlike the mere delaying effects that
the Great Depression had on New York’s rise and the depression’s argua-
ble connection to the First World War,148 the real estate and stock market
bubbles in Japan appear to be the first instance in which an economic crisis
that was wholly unrelated to a war managed to completely halt the ascen-
dance of a promising candidate financial center.149 Therefore, the case of
Tokyo’s rise and subsequent failure to surpass New York because of the
bursting of the real estate and stock market bubbles presents a marked
shift in the evolution of the factor of stability, in that the element of eco-
nomic crisis can no longer be viewed as merely a knock-on effect of a
much more impactful war. Rather, moving from the late twentieth century
into the early twenty-first century, the element of economic crisis appears
to surpass the element of war in terms of significance.
F. New York to London
Finishing this historical overview of the rise-and-fall cycles among top
international financial centers, the case of London overtaking New York
presents the most recent iterations of the factors. As a preliminary matter,
this cycle is unique as compared to earlier cycles in that there was not a
definitive moment where London surpassed New York. Rather, there is
some debate as to when exactly London managed to wrest the position of
the leading international financial center back from New York, depending
on the metric one employs.150 One possible explanation is that London
only managed to reclaim its former status by gradually slipping past New
York, rather than by leaping ahead, because the major destabilizing event
that did occur during this cycle, the Financial Crisis of 2008, had severe
negative impacts on both financial centers, and thus resulted in neither
being able to gain a significant advantage over the other sufficient to
demonstrate a more abrupt shift.151 Another explanation, also related to
the absence of a catalytic effect, is that this cycle was more about London’s
rise back into prominence than it was about New York being a financial
center in decline. As explained below, both financial centers were exper-
iencing significant growth during the late twentieth and early twenty-first
centuries, due largely to increased globalization and innovation in the in-
148. See Kindleberger, supra note 64, at 61.
149. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 268–70.
150. Compare, e.g., Kindleberger, supra note 64, at 61–62 (stating that London over-
took New York in the 1970s with the advent of the Eurodollar markets and foreign branching
by American firms into London to engage in regulatory arbitrage); with MARK YEANDLE ET
AL., THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF LONDON AS A GLOBAL FINANCIAL CENTRE 6–7 (Nov.
2005) [hereinafter “Yeandle (2005)”] (showing that between 2003 and 2005 London had just
managed to achieve a narrow lead above New York as the leading international financial
center).
151. Compare, e.g., Yeandle (2005), supra note 150, at 6–7, with 15 MARK YEANDLE &
NICK DANEV, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CENTERS INDEX 5 (2014) [hereinafter “GFCI 15”]
(showing New York overtaking London); and 18 MARK YEANDLE, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CENTERS INDEX 4 (2015) [hereinafter “GFCI 18”] (showing London overtaking New York).
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ternational financial system. Under this view, then, the reason that
London was able to reclaim its former position from New York was that
London managed to capture a greater proportion of the financial activity
created by these developments within the international financial system,
while New York’s strength remained more reliant upon the continued
growth and strength of the United States’ economy than its own position
as an international financial center.152 By looking primarily at the factors
of trust, central banking and monetary policy, and state financial policy,
one can see how the evolving nature of international finance, on a more
general level, subsequently led to these factors manifesting in novel ways.
Furthermore, by seeing how a shift may occur during a period where the
factor of stability is unable to catalyze a shift in prominence among leading
international financial centers, one can understand how the significance of
the factor of stability may evolve in future cycles.
Compared to previous iterations of this factor, trust appears to have
undergone a significant evolutionary shift during London’s rise above New
York, due in large part to globalization before and during this period.153
The increased internationalization of financial activities redefined how
market connections might expand or limit the prominence of an interna-
tional financial center. Specifically, the significance of market connections
to a strong domestic economy appears to have become less important rela-
tive to that of strong connections to foreign economies in determining the
relative prominence of an international financial center, much to London’s
benefit and New York’s detriment.154 While the strength of the United
States economy may have provided New York’s financial sector and the
financial institutions based therein with a great deal of sway in setting the
overall tone of international finance,155 London appears to have benefit-
ted from a phenomenon, otherwise referred to as the “Wimbledon effect,”
where the strength and success of the city as a financial center has come to
be largely dependent on financial activity brought in by foreign institu-
tions.156 In turn, the result of this phenomenon has been that London, as
152. See Cassis (2016), supra note 1, at 310; see also CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note
5, at 288 (“[A]lthough London holds top ranking for international financial activities, it drops
back to third place, behind New York and Tokyo, if national financial activities are
included.”).
153. See, e.g., Cassis (2016), supra note 1, at 309–10 (noting how globalization was one
of a set of factors that had a significant impact on the nature of activities within the interna-
tional financial system during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries).
154. See, e.g., Int’l Monetary Fund, Monetary & Exchange Affairs Dep’t, Offshore Fi-
nancial Centers (Background Note, June 23, 2000) (“In terms of assets, London is the largest
and most established such center, followed by New York, the difference being that the pro-
portion of international to domestic business is much greater in the former.”) (emphasis ad-
ded), https://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm.
155. See Cassis (2016), supra note 1, at 310.
156. See id. (citing generally RICHARD ROBERTS & DAVID KYNASTON, THE CITY
STATE: HOW THE MARKETS CAME TO RULE OUR WORLD (2001)); see also Yeandle (2005),
supra note 150, at 16 (“We could argue that London has the advantage of the “Wimbledon
Effect”, i.e. being seen as a place of fair dealing and regulation for locals and overseas partici-
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an international financial center, has managed to achieve a level of promi-
nence that otherwise would be considered disproportionate relative to En-
gland’s actual economic weight worldwide.157 However, to an extent, this
evolution may also be regarded as a double-edged sword for certain lead-
ing international financial centers. For instance, on the one edge, as ex-
plained above, a financial center like London may be able to rise to the
position of the leading international financial center even though its do-
mestic economy is not the largest or most significant one worldwide by
attracting a high volume of activity from foreign financial institutions. On
the other edge, though, a strong domestic economy appears to have the
potential to insulate an international financial center’s status within the
global hierarchy of such financial centers, where a financial center lacking
such insulation becomes heavily dependent on the uninterrupted importa-
tion of financial activity from foreign institutions in order to maintain its
status.158 Therefore, in the case of London, while this evolution in the ele-
ment of market connections has helped it to surpass New York, were the
flow of financial activity from foreign institutions to be disrupted or other-
wise reduced, the city’s status as the leading international financial center
would most likely be severely undermined.
Beyond the element of market connections under the factor of trust,
London’s rise back into prominence also benefitted from developments in
the elements of experience and relationships. First, with respect to the ele-
ment of experience, though London had fallen behind New York in the
wake of the Second World War, the city maintained its status as a signifi-
cant financial center because, for the most part, the financial institutions
and primary sources of expertise within the London financial sector were
still intact despite the war’s destruction.159 This retention of experience
proved to be especially beneficial for London as new financial innovations,
such as the Eurodollar market described below, readily found London to
be a suitable hub for activity because of the city’s deep financial tradi-
tions.160 In addition to the retention of experience, London also held an
advantage over New York in its ability to import additional expertise
through more accommodating immigration laws and a history of welcom-
ing foreign traders.161 Thus, while New York and London are both re-
garded as having highly skilled workforces,162 the United States’ relatively
pants.”). The Wimbledon Effect is named such as a reference to the English tennis tourna-
ment, and the fact that, while England hosts the tournament, its winners are primarily foreign
athletes. See, e.g., Death by a Thousand Cuts, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 7, 2012) (“This ‘Wimble-
don effect’, in which Britain provides the courts but not necessarily the players . . . .”), http://
www.economist.com/node/21542398.
157. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 287.
158. See Cassis (2016), supra note 1, at 310.
159. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 209.
160. See id. at 266–67.
161. See Coispeau, supra note 6, at 166–67, 204.
162. See, e.g., Yeandle (2005), supra note 150, at 18.
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strict immigration policies arguably undercut New York’s competitiveness
in attracting talent and allowed the more-welcoming London to attract
much greater volumes of foreign talent.163 As for relationships, in the
wake of the Second World War, London had managed to retain its exten-
sive international banking network, and this network continued to grow as
innovations in finance and the effects globalization during the late twenti-
eth century increased the number of services the city’s financial sector was
able to offer.164 However, in contrast with past cycles, where commercial
and interpersonal relationships were intrinsically linked in strengthening
the position of a leading international financial center, the expansion of
London’s network of relationships among foreign banks was fueled almost
entirely by commercial financial interests.165 Thus, while interpersonal
connections may have helped establish the initial foundations for
London’s international relationship network in previous cycles, by the
time London reclaimed its position as the leading international financial
center, commercial relationships became more critical in determining the
balance of this element under the factor of trust.
Like the factor of trust, the factor of central banking and monetary
policy also underwent a significant change during the period of London’s
rise, largely because of the effects of new innovations in the city’s financial
sector and globalization. Arguably, the most significant change was that
the link between the relative strength of a given international financial
center and the strength of such a center’s native currency was largely sev-
ered, which came to benefit London’s status as an international financial
center immensely.166 On a general level, this severing phenomenon was
caused primarily by both the worldwide movement of currencies to a sys-
tem of floating exchange rates, instead of continuing to maintain a system
of fixed exchange rates under the gold standard, and the overall liberaliza-
tion of international capital movements.167 As a result of these changes,
London’s strength as a financial center was no longer significantly tied to
that of the pound sterling. Instead, the relative strength of London became
more dependent on the ability of the city’s financial sector to attract and
clear transactions denominated in foreign currencies, such as the dollar.168
An illustration of this change, and how London came to benefit from
it, can be found in the emergence of the Eurodollar market in the mid-to-
163. See Coispeau, supra note 6, at 166–67, 204.
164. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 210, 224. By the time London sur-
passed New York as the top international financial center around the early twenty-first cen-
tury, the city hosted just under twice as many foreign banks as New York. See Yeandle
(2005), supra note 150, at 54 (“London also has the most foreign banks (486) compared
with . . . New York (253).”).
165. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 267–77.
166. See id. at 290.
167. See id.
168. See id.
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late twentieth century.169 For background, the Eurodollar market was es-
sentially a short-term money market for dollars held outside the United
States that initially arose primarily as a regulatory arbitrage technique,
among other non-financial causes.170 Specifically, American financial in-
stitutions began to deposit dollars overseas to avoid the caps Regulation Q
set on the interest rates paid on deposits, as well as other capital controls,
and essentially led to the creation of an international capital market to
circumvent these regulatory restrictions.171 There are two primary reasons
why London was a major beneficiary of this new arbitrage-oriented capital
market. The first reason is that English banks were able to offer much
higher interest rates on deposits than American banks subject to Regula-
tion Q because of the prevailing high interest rates in England during this
period.172 The second reason is that London’s financial sector had deep
historical expertise and the requisite capacity for managing these kinds of
international capital market transactions, further enabling the city to be-
come a home for the emerging Eurodollar market.173 Furthermore, but-
tressing the emergence of this capital market were the Bank of England’s
relatively liberal policies towards permitting the financial institutions of
London to engage in Eurodollar market transactions, especially compared
to their European counterparts.174 In particular, the Bank of England
adopted policies that differentiated their regulatory treatments of interna-
tional financial activities on behalf of foreign clients in dollar, or other
foreign currency, denominations, and domestic financial activities in
pound sterling denominations. By leaving the former relatively unregu-
lated and the latter more tightly regulated,175 the Bank of England sought
169. The Eurodollar markets were one subset of a larger system of “Euromarkets,”
which was comprised of various types of money markets for dollars held outside the United
States. While this section will focus primarily on the Eurodollar market, there were also the
Eurobond and Eurocredit markets. For further background on the Euromarkets and their
emergence, see id. at 219–23; see also Cassis (2016), supra note 1, at 309.
170. See Cassis (2016), supra note 1, at 309.
171. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 219–20; see also Kennedy, supra note
10, at 62.
172. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 220; see also Catherine R. Schenk,
International Financial Centres 1958–1971: Competitiveness and Complementarity, in EURO-
PEAN BANKS AND THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE 85 (Stefano Battilossi & Youssef Cassis eds.,
2002).
173. See id. at 223.
174. See Cassis (2016), supra note 1, at 308.
175. See id. (citing generally NIALL FERGUSON, HIGH FINANCIER: THE LIVES AND TIME
OF SIEGMUND WARBURG (2010); Stefano Battilossi, Introduction: International Banking and
the American Challenge, in EUROPEAN BANKS AND THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE (Stefano
Battilossi & Youssef Cassis eds., 2002); Catherine R. Schenk, The Origins of the Eurodollar
Market in London, 35 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 221–38 (1998); see also IAN KERR, A
HISTORY OF THE EUROBOND MARKET: THE FIRST 21 YEARS (1984).
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to encourage and protect the development of the Eurodollar market in
London.176
England’s more industry-friendly approach to regulation, as compared
to that of the United States, would also have a significant role in London’s
rise above New York. While both governments would gradually relax
some of their stricter regulatory policies during the late twentieth cen-
tury,177 London nevertheless managed to retain an edge over New York
by being viewed by market participants as having a relatively superior reg-
ulatory framework through its effective balancing of regulator compe-
tence, enforcement, and the overall level of regulation.178 With respect to
regulator competence, financial institutions largely favored England’s fi-
nancial sector regulator, the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”), as a
more responsive, single point of supervisory contact, especially compared
to United States’ system of overlapping federal and state regulators, often
with conflicting sector coverage and policy views.179 Moreover, the way in
which the FSA functioned, relative to United States’ regulators, was
viewed as more flexible and industry-friendly. To this point, the FSA had
primarily implemented principles-based regulatory guidance, which estab-
lished relatively clear, output-driven guidance for how financial institu-
tions should conduct their business.180 Additionally, the FSA
implemented general policy guidelines regarding the ways in which the
regulator itself would conduct its own activities, which provided financial
institutions with greater certainty as to the possible courses of action the
FSA might take under certain scenarios.181 By comparison, the United
States’ regulators developed a less flexible, largely input-driven, and more
prescriptive rules and compliance-based approach, and also lacked a com-
mon set of principles-based regulatory guidance for how the regulators
themselves would conduct their own activities.182 While these rules and
compliance-based regulations did in fact yield benefits towards increased
stability within the United States’ financial sector, the regulatory model as
a whole appeared to undermine New York’s competitiveness as an inter-
176. See, e.g., Schenk, supra note 172, at 85 (“It is par excellence an example of the kind
of business which London ought to be able to do both well and profitably. That is why we, at
the Bank [of England], have never seen any reason to place any obstacles in the way of
London taking its full and increasing share. If we were to stop the business here, it would
move to other centres with a consequent loss of earnings for London.”) (citing HUMPHREY B.
MYNORS, LETTER TO SIR CHARLES HAMBRO (1963)).
177. See, e.g., CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 244–48 (discussing the trend to-
wards deregulation in both England and the United States during the 1980s and 90s).
178. See CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF FIN. INNOVATION, SIZING UP THE CITY–LONDON’S
RANKING AS A FINANCIAL CENTRE 15–16 (2003) [hereinafter “CSFI”]; MCKINSEY & CO.,
SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 78–81
(Jan. 2007), http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf.
179. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 178, at 81–82.
180. See id. at 82.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 83.
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national financial center through increased, yet avoidable, transaction
costs.183
London also had an edge over New York in that the FSA’s method of
enforcement was viewed by financial institutions as being more receptive
and geared towards producing better results, while the United States’ ap-
proach was viewed as being far more fragmented with a number of unde-
sirable knock-on effects.184 While some regulators within the United
States’ regulatory framework, such as the New York Federal Reserve
Bank, were viewed by financial institutions as being more effective in their
use of collaborative issue resolution procedures, there were nevertheless a
number of other regulators that were viewed in the aforementioned nega-
tive light.185 In fact, some policies of financial regulators in the United
States were viewed by financial institutions as being so draconian that the
institutions felt they were all but coerced into redirecting their business
through less litigious jurisdictions like  London.186
Furthermore, English policymakers struck a better balance than the
United States’ policymakers regarding the appropriate level of regulation
through avoiding the implementation of overly burdensome regulations,
while also maintaining sufficient regulatory coverage to instill confidence
in the stability of the financial institutions operating within London’s fi-
nancial sector.187 By comparison, and to New York’s detriment, the
United States’ regulatory structure was viewed by financial institutions as
183. See id. (“Although there are benefits from an increase in compliance-related ex-
penditures, the [Securities Industry Association (“SIA”)] report found that ‘a substantial
portion of these increased costs were avoidable, reflecting, among other things: duplication of
examinations, regulations and supervisory actions; inconsistencies/lack of harmonization in
rules and regulations; ambiguity; and delays in obtaining clear guidance.’”) (citing SIA Re-
search Reports, 7 (Feb. 22, 2006)).
184. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 178, at 84. These knock-on effects included more
punitive resolutions, increased publicity of enforcement actions, and more costly enforce-
ment, due largely to the possibility of multiple enforcement actions at the federal and state
level, as well as the possibility of both criminal and civil penalties in different jurisdictions.
185. See id. at 84–85.
186. See id. at 85. A notable example of such a policy was the Department of Justice’s
Thompson Memorandum, which authorized federal prosecutors to weigh the decision of a
corporation whether or not to waive its attorney-client privilege as a factor when considering
seeking a federal indictment. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATT’Y
GEN., Memorandum on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, 7 (Jan.
20, 2003). Though the Department of Justice would largely reverse its stance in the McNulty
Memorandum, the change still left financial institutions without a safe harbor from reprisals
when sharing the findings of internal investigations with the appropriate regulators. See U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATT’Y GEN., MEMORANDUM ON PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 8–11 (2006); see also MCKINSEY &
CO., supra note 178, at 85.
187. See CSFI, supra note 178, at 15–16. The CSFI study noted that, in some sectors of
the financial market where the FSA did not have enough regulatory coverage, business had
actually turned away from London in search of a market where there was greater regulatory
coverage, suggesting that a certain level of regulation carries with it reputational advantages
for the financial institutions operating within a given regulatory framework.
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being more burdensome and lacking harmony with other international
regulatory systems.188 In particular, during London’s rise above New
York, two areas where financial regulation in the United States was
viewed as being less hospitable were in the corporate governance require-
ments laid out in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and in the United States’ ac-
counting standards under the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(“GAAP”). With respect to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, while many financial
institutions viewed the act’s corporate governance and transparency re-
forms as being positive developments in regulation, they also believed the
costs of compliance and potential penalties far outweighed whatever bene-
fits the act provided.189 Due to this cost-benefit imbalance, a number of
foreign financial institutions, which would have otherwise qualified for list-
ing on New York’s stock exchanges, opted to remain unlisted.190 As for
the United States’ accounting standards under GAAP, financial institu-
tions viewed the divergences between GAAP and the International Finan-
cial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) as giving rise to unintended
consequences in practice, such as the reporting of figures that did not ac-
curately reflect economic reality, and thus placed New York at a slight
competitive disadvantage relative to London on this front.191 However, as
noted below, it is worth noting that while London’s regulatory framework
benefitted the city during its rise above New York, in the wake of the
Financial Crisis of 2008, the reputation of London’s regulatory framework
would come to be severely tarnished as the crisis unfolded due to per-
ceived oversights and insufficient regulatory coverage.192
Finally, considering stability, while in some respects the Financial Crisis
of 2008 continued the trend of economic crises becoming more a signifi-
cant destabilizing element relative to wars, during this cycle the factor
manifested in a rather unique way because of increased levels of globaliza-
tion. Specifically, even though the destabilizing effects of the element of
an economic crisis were abundantly present through the Financial Crisis of
2008, which was arguably the worst financial crisis since the Great Depres-
sion,193 the effects of this crisis did not actually catalyze the shift in promi-
nence between London and New York. Rather, unlike the previous crises
discussed above, such as the Great Depression and the Japanese real es-
188. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 178, at 86.
189. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 178, at 87.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 86, 89.
192. See, e.g., 4 MARK YEANDLE ET AL., THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CENTRES INDEX 2–4
(2008) [hereinafter “GFCI 4”] (discussing how the collapse and subsequent poor handling of
Northern Rock’s nationalization led to an increase in negative perceptions about the quality
of London’s regulatory framework).
193. See Coispeau, supra note 6, at 257–58. This Note will not explore the full extent of
the causes, impacts, and subsequent responses to the Financial Crisis of 2008, as that would
go well beyond the scope of its topic. However, for further, general background on the Finan-
cial Crisis of 2008, see Barr et al., supra note 19, at 58–63; see also CAPITALS OF CAPITAL,
supra note 5, at 280–85.
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tate and stock market bubbles, both financial centers, among others, had
their positions severely weakened by this crisis, resulting in neither being
able to gain any significant advantages over the other. For example, in the
wake of the Financial Crisis the financial sectors of both London and New
York were negatively impacted by fallout from the failure of major finan-
cial institutions such as Lehman Brothers.194 Both had their home govern-
ments engaging in substantial bailouts to prevent further failures from
occurring among their most significant financial institutions.195 Both were
impacted by widespread job losses that were not just limited to the finan-
cial sector.196 Finally, both  had their reputations as leading financial cen-
ters severely tarnished,197 among a host of other severe economic and
social impacts. In this way, the Financial Crisis of 2008 may represent yet
another evolutionary step with respect to the factor of stability, in that the
catalytic effects of this factor may come to be more muted in the modern
international financial system because the effects of economic crises have
come to be felt on a more widespread and global level, in a more contem-
poraneous fashion, and with more uniform degrees of severity.198 Under
this development, it may be very difficult, if not impossible, for a future
ascendant financial center to gain any advantages from the negative effects
of an economic crisis, as the high degree of international connectivity nec-
essary to rise to the position of the leading international financial center
would expose the aspirant financial center to the same negative effects
that would render the former leading financial center vulnerable to being
surpassed.199
An alternative view of this phenomenon could be that the destabilizing
effects of economic crises may still have a catalytic effect on rise-and-fall
cycles through the responses of individuals, financial institutions, and gov-
ernments in their wake. In other words, rather than the direct impacts of
an economic crisis catalyzing an abrupt shift in prominence, the indirect
effects of a crisis, such as political backlash, reactionary regulatory re-
forms, and declining public trust in financial institutions, may come to be
194. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 284.
195. See id. Some of the more notable bailouts included the English government’s
bailouts of HBOS and the Royal Bank of Scotland, and the United States government’s
bailouts of AIG, Goldman Sachs, and Citigroup, among others.
196. In the United States, “the unemployment rate more than doubled to 10%” in the
wake of the crisis. See Barr et al., supra note 19, at 61. By comparison, in England the unem-
ployment rate rose from around 5% to around 8% in the wake of the crisis. See CECILIA
CAMPOS ET AL., IMPACT OF THE RECESSION 9 (Office for Nat’l Statistics 2010/11).
197. See GFCI 4, supra note 192, at 2–4.
198. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 282.
199. For perspective on how increased international connectivity could impact ascen-
dant financial centers in the future, see generally Shiv Chowla et al., How Have World
Shocks Affected the UK Economy? in Q2 QUARTERLY BULLETIN (Bank of England 2014),
available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2014/
qb14q206.pdf, which discusses the various transmission channels that made England particu-
larly vulnerable to the effects of the Financial Crisis of 2008.
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the more significant catalysts. With respect to London’s rise, while it had
arguably crept past New York to reassume its role as the leading interna-
tional financial center even before the Financial Crisis of 2008,200 whether
and how long the city will retain this position will likely be determined by
these lingering, indirect effects of the crisis, and how much instability they
have injected into London’s financial system.
II. POST-BREXIT AND THE NEXT POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL CENTER
A. The Position of London Post-Brexit
 In considering how the next rise-and-fall cycle among leading interna-
tional financial centers may come about, the first step is to assess the posi-
tion of the current leading financial center, London. Though London
retains many of the advantages that helped it to surpass New York in the
late twentieth and early twenty first century, Brexit and England’s im-
pending withdrawal from the European Union will likely have a significant
impact on whether the factors will remain in London’s favor or come to
weigh against it. Currently, however, because the Brexit negotiations have
only just begun, exactly how London’s position as the leading interna-
tional financial center may be affected, or the balance of the factors may
shift, is speculative at best. While some have commented that the perva-
sive uncertainty surrounding London’s future status may come to under-
mine the city’s position even before the terms of England’s withdrawal
from the European Union are fixed,201 in actuality London’s financial sec-
tor has remained remarkably stable in the wake of the Brexit referen-
dum.202 Therefore, this section will contemplate how the balance of the
factors may shift for or against London post-Brexit, and whether, based on
London’s current position, those shifts would leave London vulnerable to
being surpassed by a potential candidate for the leading international fi-
nancial center position. The next section will then evaluate a selection of
these potential candidates to see whether, based on the factors, they legiti-
mately have a chance of surpassing London.
Considering first the factor of trust, to summarize from the discussion
above, London has thus far benefitted from the following qualities: the
ability to attract a high volume of foreign financial activity to its markets
through the so-called “Wimbledon effect,” the ability to attract a greater
200. See, e.g., Yeandle (2005), supra note 150, at 6–7 (showing that between 2003 and
2005 London had achieved a narrow lead above New York as the top international financial
center).
201. See, e.g., Katie Allen, Majority of Managers Think Brexit Uncertainty will Affect
UK Economy, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 27, 2016, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/busi-
ness/2016/dec/28/majority-of-managers-think-brexit-uncertainty-will-affect-uk-economy.
202. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 1 (2016) [hereinafter
“WEO 2016”] (“[B]eyond a sharp depreciation of the pound, broader market reaction to the
Brexit vote has generally been contained, with equity valuations and risk appetite recovering
after an initial drop . . . .”).
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number of foreign traders to work in the city due to relatively welcoming
immigration policies, and London-based financial institutions having an
expansive network of international relationships. A common thread
among these trust-based benefits is they appear to turn on the ability of
London’s financial sector to maintain a predominantly international orien-
tation, especially because London lacks the support of a relatively massive
domestic economy, which could insulate its status as the leading interna-
tional financial center. While post-Brexit London would likely be able to
retain the benefits of an experienced domestic workforce in its financial
sector, along with the presence of some foreign firms,203 there is a signifi-
cant risk that increased operational costs may prompt some financial insti-
tutions to shift their business activity away from the city, if not prompt
their departure entirely.204
The most likely source of such increased operational costs would be
the loss of London’s access to the European Union’s single passport sys-
tem, which allows foreign financial institutions, after having established an
authorized office in London, to offer cross-border services and open
branches across other member states without needing to obtain additional
regulatory approval from local authorities.205 In addition, if Europe may
be viewed as being London’s de facto domestic economy,206 the loss of the
city’s access to the European Union’s single passport system would likely
negatively impact any status-insulating effects that the city’s ties to the
European economy may have previously provided. As for Brexit’s poten-
tial impacts on London’s more welcoming immigration policies, the city’s
withdrawal from the European Union will likely impact its ability to con-
tinue to expand the experienced workforce within its financial sector, in
part because the city would lose access to the European Union’s freedom
of movement for workers.207 Moreover, London’s ability to attract foreign
talent to its financial sector may also be negatively impacted by political
movements seeking to impose substantial restrictions on immigration into
203. See Isaac Wohl, Exec. Briefings on Trade: The Impact of Brexit on Financial Ser-
vices 2 (USITC 2016), available at https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/executive_briefings/
wohl_ brexit_and_financial_services_final.pdf.
204. See Simeon Djankov, The City of London After Brexit 6 (PIIE Policy Brief No.
PB17-9, Feb. 2017).
205. See Ansgar Belke et al., Policy Uncertainty and International Financial Markets:
The Case of Brexit 6 (Ruhr Econ. Notes Papers No. 657, Oct. 2016), available at http://
hdl.handle.net/10419/148386.
206. See, e.g., Yeandle (2005), supra note 150, at 17 (“The size of North America’s on-
shore market guarantees New York’s success. On the other hand, we could argue that Eu-
rope is London’s domestic market as North America is New York’s.”).
207. The freedom of movement of workers “includes the rights of movement and resi-
dence for workers, the rights of entry and residence for family members, and the right to
work in another Member State and be treated on an equal footing with nationals of that
Member State.” See Marion Schmid-Drüner, Free Movement of Workers, in EUR. PARLIA-
MENT: FACT SHEETS ON THE E.U. (Dec. 2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/
en/displayFtu.html?ftuId
U_3.1.3.html.
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England.208 Despite these potential negative impacts, London may be able
to preserve its status by pivoting towards attracting more financial activity
from other international regions, such as Asia or the Middle East,209 or by
adopting a more business-friendly regulatory framework with more
targeted regulations, akin to Singapore, that would continue to attract a
high volume of foreign financial activity to the city.210
Considering central banking and monetary policy and state financial
policy, while the reputation of London’s regulatory framework suffered in
the wake of the Financial Crisis, the English government has since enacted
a number of key regulatory reforms in an effort to restore trust and confi-
dence in its financial sector.211 Moreover, it is possible that, post Brexit,
further restructuring within London’s regulatory framework could miti-
gate the negative effects of its withdrawal from the European Union.
However, while London has benefitted from the efforts of the Bank of
England, among other central banks, to keep the international financial
system stable in the wake of the Brexit referendum,212 there is a substan-
tial risk that the prior success of the referendum will inspire additional
inward-oriented policy shifts that would further distance London from the
international financial system and undermine the city’s strength as an in-
ternational financial center.213
Next, with respect to stability, the Brexit referendum itself could be
considered to be a new kind of destabilizing element.214 As the referen-
dum was a political novelty, English policymakers must now conduct ex-
tensive reevaluations regarding the nation’s relationships and make a
208. See, e.g., Shearman & Sterling LLP, Brexit: Free Movement of Persons 1 (Client
Publication, Aug. 5, 2016) (“According to polling, much of the UK electorate was concerned
about the essentially unrestricted nature of EU immigration to the UK.”), http://
www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2016/08/Brexit-Free-Movement
-of-Persons-FIAFR-080516.pdf.
209. See Djankov, supra note 204, at 6.
210. See Barnabas Reynolds, A Blueprint for Brexit: The Future of Global Financial
Services and Markets in the UK 27–29 (Politeia 2016), http://www.politeia.co.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2016/11/Barnabas-Reynolds-A-Blueprint-for-Brexit-2.pdf; see also Brexit: UK
‘Could Change Economic Model’ if Single Market Access Denied, BBC (Jan. 15, 2017), http://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-38628428.
211. For a broad overview of English post-crisis regulatory reforms, see British Bankers
Assoc., Reforms Since the Financial Crisis (BBA Briefing Jan. 2016), https://www.bba.org.uk/
news/reports/bba-briefing-reforms-since-the-financial-crisis/.
212. See WEO 2016, supra note 202, at 8, 30 (noting the Bank of England’s actions in
the wake of the referendum vote, which included “cut[ting] the policy rate, boost[ing] quanti-
tative easing, and undert[aking] a number of other initiatives to support sentiment”); Int’l
Monetary Fund, Uncertainty in the Aftermath of the U.K. Referendum 5 (July 2016) [herein-
after “WEO Update 2016”].
213. See WEO 2016, supra note 202, at 1 (“[T]he [Brexit] vote is not only a symptom of
fraying consensus on the benefits of cross-border economic integration amid weak growth
but could catalyze pressures for inward-looking policies elsewhere as well.”).
214. See, e.g., WEO Update 2016, supra note 212, at 2 (describing some of the initial
economic shocks that occurred in the wake of the Brexit referendum).
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number of significant policy decisions that will undoubtedly impact the
future of English finance.215 In turn, this has injected a substantial amount
of destabilizing uncertainty regarding the future position of London as an
international financial center. However, the initial market shocks that fol-
lowed in the wake of the Brexit referendum have largely stabilized as mar-
ket participants wait to see the actual results of the Brexit negotiations.
Thus, barring any unforeseen economic crises or the outbreak of a war,
the effect of Brexit on London’s stability remains uncertain.
However, the specter of the Financial Crisis was still arguably present
through its lingering effects on the English economy leading up to the
Brexit referendum, and it will likely continue to be present during the
Brexit negotiations. While economic recovery as a whole within England
had been relatively anemic as compared to past recoveries,216 most of the
post-crisis recovery benefits that had been realized had largely flowed to
London, due in no small part to its status as the leading international fi-
nancial center.217 As a result, a significant number of English voters who
supported the Brexit referendum were also those who were likely still suf-
fering from the lingering effects of the Financial Crisis, and may have
made their decision in part out of resentment for the unequal realization
of post-crisis recovery benefits.218 The continuation of low interest rates
and lower economic growth projections may yet come to have a negative
impact on London’s position as an international financial center.219 Specif-
ically, while lower long-term interest rates may have the beneficial effect
of stimulating increased economic activity, these lower interest rates also
reduce the profits of financial institutions, and may incentivize greater risk
taking as these institutions attempt to reach for greater yields.220 Thus, to
an extent, this situation is the opposite of the high interest rate environ-
ment that attracted greater financial activity to London and contributed to
the city’s previous rise above New York, and also increases the city’s expo-
sure to further economic shocks or crises if institutions begin to engage in
greater risk taking to boost their flagging profits.
Lastly, as a brief summary, while the exact ways in which the factors
might indicate the relative strength or vulnerability of London’s position
will likely remain uncertain until the terms of the Brexit negotiations are
fixed, at a glance, it would appear as if London will likely become vulnera-
215. See Belke et al., supra note 205, at 5.
216. See generally Jon Cunliffe, Dep’y Gov. for Fin. Stability, Bank of England, The UK
Economy Post Crisis: A Series of Unfortunate Events?, Speech at the at Centre for Interna-
tional Business Studies (Feb. 24, 2016) (describing some of the factors contributing to the
slowness of England’s recovery following the Financial Crisis of 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2016/speech884.pdf).
217. See Agust Arnorsson & Gylfi Zoega, On the Causes of Brexit 4–5, 7 (CESifo
Working Note No. 6056, Aug. 2016).
218. See id. at 17–18.
219. See WEO 2016, supra note 202, at 20.
220. See OFFICE OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 3 (2016).
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ble to being surpassed. This potential vulnerability is due in part to the risk
that, post-Brexit, a number of trust-related advantages that London cur-
rently benefits from may come to be undermined, if not lost entirely. Fur-
thermore, this potential vulnerability is also due in part to the risk that a
destabilizing economic crisis may yet come to impact London’s financial
sector, especially given the current macroeconomic climate. While central
banking, monetary policy, and state financial policy may be able to miti-
gate some of the negative impacts that London could face, the effective-
ness of such measures remains speculative, and may not even occur if
English financial policies become more inward-oriented. Therefore, as-
suming that there is in fact a capable candidate financial center, it does
appear likely that London may become vulnerable to being surpassed as
the leading international financial center in the near future.
B. Looking for Potential Challengers to London–What the Factors
Reveal
If London’s is made vulnerable by the outcome of the Brexit negotia-
tions, for London to be surpassed there will also likely need to be a prom-
ising candidate financial center that would be capable of assuming the
responsibilities required of the leading international financial center. From
the previous rise-and-fall cycles, particularly that of New York’s rise above
London, there appears to be a condition that, in order for a smooth transi-
tion of responsibility within the hierarchy of international financial centers
to occur, the most promising candidate financial center must affirmatively
seize responsibility from the former, but weakened, leading international
financial center. Thus, for London to be surpassed, it would likely not be
sufficient for the city to be merely weakened post-Brexit for a transition to
occur. Rather, there would also need to be a substantially contemporane-
ous rise in the prominence of another competing financial center that
would be able to assume London’s leading position in the international
financial system. While there have been numerous suggestions as to the
identities of these potential candidates, located both within European
Union221 and in other regions of the world,222 this Note will narrow its
analysis to evaluating the potential of one promising candidate from each
of the three international regions where some have suggested that a poten-
tial candidate might emerge: Frankfurt from the European Union; New
York from North America; and, Singapore from Asia.
Frankfurt. Looking first at Frankfurt, the city has been widely sug-
gested as a potential candidate to replace London as a leading financial
center post-Brexit, at least within the European Union.223 From a histori-
221. See, e.g., Finch, supra note 4 (providing a list of potential cities within the Euro-
pean Union where bankers could move to post-Brexit).
222. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 4 (identifying the possibility that Brexit may result in
financial activity leaving Europe for Asian financial centers like Singapore or Hong Kong).
223. See, e.g., James Shotter et al., Frankfurt Takes Early Lead in Brexit Race to Poach
City Jobs, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017) (describing the strong position of Frankfurt rela-
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cal perspective, however, this suggestion is far from novel, as some had
speculated as recently as the mid-1990s that Frankfurt would come to sur-
pass London as a financial center in the future.224 However, at that time
such speculation about Frankfurt’s ability to surpass London proved to be
overly optimistic, and, based on the factors, this prediction in the wake of
Brexit may yet again overestimate the ability of Frankfurt’s financial sec-
tor to surpass London’s.
Considered broadly, the factors of central banking and monetary pol-
icy and state financial policy appear to be largely behind Frankfurt’s per-
ceived strength to surpass London. Primarily, this is due to the many forms
of support the city has received from political entities throughout its rise
back into prominence, which in some respects is a reversal of how previ-
ously, following the unification of the German states, political forces had
worked to undermine Frankfurt’s position as a financial center. Looking
first at Frankfurt’s rise back into prominence more generally, the city re-
claimed its position as a leading financial center within Germany following
the Second World War, when Allied forces decided to establish the head-
quarters of the new West German central bank, the Bundesbank, in
Frankfurt.225 This decision led to an increased concentration of German
financial activity within Frankfurt, as the leading German banks estab-
lished their headquarters within the city.226
The next significant wave of political support for Frankfurt would
come after the formation of the European Union, when a number of the
E.U.’s key regulatory institutions for financial and monetary policy also
established their headquarters within the city, including the European
Central Bank and the European Insurance and Occupational Authority,
among others.227 Thus, in light of this more recent development, Frankfurt
is the de facto epicenter of  financial and monetary policy regulation
within the European Union.228 As a final point of consideration, Frank-
furt’s position within the European Union, more generally, is likely further
strengthened by virtue of its status as a German city, given Germany’s
dominant role within the governance structures of the E.U.229 Despite
these substantial political advantages buttressing Frankfurt’s strength as
an international financial center, indexes that compare  Frankfurt against
tive to other European financial centers in competing for financial business post-Brexit),
https://www.ft.com/content/fc39820c-05a2-11e7-ace0-1ce02ef0def9.
224. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 272.
225. See id. at 216.
226. See id. at 217.
227. See id. at 272; Michael Kimmer, Bankenverband, Frankfurt as a Financial Center
and Brexit 4 (Aug. 18, 2016), https://bankenverband.de/media/files/2016-08-18-Frank-
furt_and_Brexit-EN.pdf.
228. See Kimmer, supra note 227, at 4.
229. See Josef Janning & Almut Möller, Leading from the Centre: Germany’s New Role
in Europe 2 (ECFR Policy Brief No. 183, July 2016), available at http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/
ECFR_183_-_GERMAN_LEADERSHIP2.pdf.
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other leading international financial centers indicate that Frankfurt is not
as strong as one might think.230 In explaining this conclusion, the other
factors of trust and stability provide guidance.
Starting with trust, while Frankfurt benefits to an extent from the ele-
ment of relationships, as brought in from foreign banks based within the
city, and also its ability to offer foreign banks access to the single passport
framework in the European Union, the overall percentage of foreign
banks within Frankfurt, relative to London, is substantially lower.231
Moreover, Frankfurt is vastly outstripped by London in terms of its ability
to build and support a financial sector capable of fulfilling the role of the
leading international financial center, due primarily to London’s much
larger population size, which is necessary to support a sufficiently large
workforce in its financial sector,232 and London’s ability to attract more
foreign talent through greater international orientation and lower lan-
guage barriers.233 As for stability, while in the wake of the Financial Crisis
the European Union as a whole enacted a number of significant regulatory
measures designed to promote and increase financial stability within the
E.U., Germany and other member states are still being affected by linger-
ing effects of the crisis, such as sluggish recovery in economic growth
rates.234 Moreover, the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in Europe, while
having much more severe effects on the nations directly impacted by this
crisis,235 has also had negative effects on other member states within the
Eurozone, including Germany.236 Lastly, in considering the possibility that
a Brexit-like event may constitute a new kind of destabilizing element with
the potential to weaken the position of an international financial center,
Frankfurt may yet be impacted by ongoing political movements within the
European Union as more nationalistic political parties seek to withdraw
from the E.U.’s membership.237
230. See, e.g., GFCI 21, supra note 2, at 4 (showing Frankfurt ranked twenty-third
among leading international financial centers, and ranked fifth among Western European
financial centers).
231. See Kimmer, supra note 227, at 8 (indicating that, at the end of 2015, 51.1% of
London’s banks were foreign banks, while 37.9% of Frankfurt’s banks were foreign banks).
232. See id. (indicating that, in 2014, the population of London was around 8.5 million,
while the population of Frankfurt was around 700 thousand).
233. See CAPITALS OF CAPITAL, supra note 5, at 273.
234. See WEO 2016, supra note 202, at 21.
235. See generally Edwin M. Truman, The IMF and Euro Area Crises (PIIE Policy Brief
No. PB16-13, Sept. 2016) (recounting the ongoing effects of the sovereign debt crisis in the
European Union and resolution issues).
236. See generally Claudia Broyer et al., Impact of the Euro Crisis on the German Econ-
omy (Allainz Econ. Research & Corp. Development Working Note No. 154, Sept. 25, 2012)
(identifying some of the negative effects that the sovereign debt crisis has had on the German
economy, including pushing down interest rates and German government bond yields).
237. See, e.g., Jefferson Chase, 10 Things You Need to Know about the AfD, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Jan. 1, 2017) (discussing the Alternative for Germany’s anti-European Union policy
stance), http://dw.com/p/2W7YF.
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Therefore, based on the factor-based analysis of Frankfurt’s current
position, it does not seem likely that the city will surpass London any time
soon. As a caveat, though, one way in which Frankfurt might be able to
strengthen its position, and thus become able to surpass London, would be
if political forces within Germany and the European Union placed their
full support behind making Frankfurt the next leading international finan-
cial center. In this way, the situation would parallel how political forces in
the newly unified German states triggered the earlier shift of Berlin over-
taking Frankfurt to become the leading financial center of Germany. How-
ever, whether political forces within the European Union would be
capable of such unity is doubtful, especially as individual member states
try to advocate for their own cities to be seen as viable candidates to re-
place London as the next leading financial center of the European
Union.238
New York. While London was able to surpass the New York previously
due to marginal advantages in each of the factors, New York nevertheless
has maintained a relatively close position behind London within the hier-
archy of international financial centers.239 Moreover, despite the negative
impacts of the Financial Crisis, the relative position of New York has re-
mained relatively unchanged.240 However, there appear to be a number of
critical lingering effects from the Financial Crisis that weaken New York’s
position. For one, with respect to trust, because the causes of the crisis
were so deeply rooted in the financial institutions of the United States,
New York, by implication, suffered a fairly severe reputational impact in
the aftermath of the crisis.241 In addition, with respect to state financial
policy and stability, post-crisis regulatory reforms within the United
States, heralded by some as bringing in much-needed regulation,242 have
nevertheless  undermined the profitability of many financial institutions
and might in itself cause future economic instability.243 Moreover, the
broad requirements of these new regulations have led New York-based
238. See, e.g., Max Colchester et al., European Cities Battle for London’s Finance
Crown After Brexit Vote, WALL ST. J. (July 1, 2016, 12:00 AM) (describing they early efforts
by Paris and Dublin to compete with Frankfurt in attracting financial institutions looking to
leave London after Brexit), https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-finance-cities-pounce-on-london-
after-brexit-vote-1467345602.
239. See, e.g., GFCI 21, supra note 2, at 4 (showing New York only two points behind
London in their index ranking).
240. See Cassis (2016), supra note 1, at 313.
241. See GFCI 4, supra note 192, at 4 (explaining that a major reason for New York’s
drop in its index score was due to reputational impacts following the onset of the Financial
Crisis of 2008).
242. See, e.g., Natasha Sarin & Lawrence H. Summers, Have Big Banks Gotten Safer? 2
(BPEA Conference Draft, Sept., 2016) (providing a brief overview of some financial and
political leaders positive feedback regarding the regulatory reforms).
243. See id. at 34 (“We find that a substantial part of the reason banks have become
riskier and effectively more leveraged is a decline in their franchise value. And while we do
not study the question in any depth it appears plausible that a large part of the reason for
declines in franchise value is regulatory activity and the prospect of future regulation. There
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financial institutions to invest more of their resources into hiring compli-
ance staff than finance professionals. This also has the potential to under-
mine the long-term competitive position of New York as a financial
center.244 Lastly, with respect to central banking and monetary policy, the
Federal Reserve Board’s hesitance to raise interest rates evidences uncer-
tainties regarding the true strength of the United States economy despite
its impressive post-crisis growth in areas such as employment, which in
turn raises questions about the overall stability of New York’s position
going forward.245
Beyond these issues, though, New York also faces the risk of poten-
tially having its position as a financial center undermined due to political
shifts that could further alter the balance of the factors. With respect to
the factors of central banking and monetary policy and state financial pol-
icy, it appears likely that the Trump administration and Republican-con-
trolled Congress will make efforts to relax some of the more stringent
post-crisis regulations, which, at least in the first couple months of the new
administration, had generated largely positive responses among inves-
tors.246 However, with respect to these same factors, there is a substantial
risk that, were the Trump administration and Republican-controlled Con-
gress to relax or entirely repeal the post-crisis regulatory reforms of the
Dodd-Frank Act, another economic crisis, originating in either the United
States or abroad, may arise with devastating consequences.247 Considering
also potential new policy enactments, the Trump administration has hinted
at the implementation of a series of protectionist policies, which in turn
would severely undermine New York’s position as an international finan-
cial center by restricting the flow of international financial activity to the
city.248 Further, the impact of such new policy enactments might also im-
plicate trust and affect New York’s ability to attract experienced financial
professionals to its financial sector, as these policies may likely impose
is a possibility that by further eroding bank franchise value, further regulatory actions could
actually increase systemic risk.”).
244. See GERSON LEHRMAN GRP., AT RISK: NEW YORK’S FUTURE AS THE WORLD FI-
NANCIAL CAPITAL 23 (2015).
245. See WEO 2016, supra note 202, at 32.
246. See, e.g., Gillian Tan, Banking on Trump, BLOOMBERG GADFLY (Nov. 9, 2016, 3:20
PM) (describing the initial stock market surge that followed President Trump’s election and
some of its causes), https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-11-09/bank-stocks-go-
nuts-for-trump-and-risk-going-overboard.
247. See generally Edwin M. Truman, International Financial Cooperation Benefits the
United States (PIIE Policy Brief No. PB17-10, Feb. 2017) (describing the negative effects that
weakening or repealing the Dodd-Frank Act might have on economic crisis prevention and
management in the United States and internationally).
248. Marcus Noland et al., Impact of Clinton’s and Trump’s Trade Proposals, in ASSESS-
ING TRADE AGENDAS IN THE US PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 37–38 (PIIE Briefing No. 16-6,
Sept. 2016) (stating how protectionist policies in the United States could trigger retaliation by
foreign nations).
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further restrictions on immigration,249 and thus exacerbate an issue that
had previously undermined New York’s ability to compete against
London.
Considering in the aggregate New York’s ability to surpass London to
become the leading international financial center once again, the city’s po-
sition is not unlike that of London itself, in that whether it will emerge as a
promising candidate depends primarily upon future decisions by policy-
makers. However, in this regard New York might have a slight advantage
over London because the policy decisions that could affect New York’s
strength as a financial center would be made almost entirely by the United
States’ government and regulatory agencies, rather than being made as a
product of negotiations between multiple governments and regulatory
bodies. However, despite whatever advantages this distinction may pro-
vide New York, these policy decisions are nonetheless what will likely de-
termine whether New York emerges as a viable candidate to surpass
London. Therefore, for the time being, the likelihood of New York sur-
passing London remains speculative, as the most significant elements that
could help or hinder New York’s chances have not yet been determined.
Singapore. Despite the fact that Singapore is a relative newcomer when
compared to the other financial centers discussed above,250 the nation now
ranks highly among the most prominent international financial centers.251
In light of Singapore’s meteoric rise to its now prominent status, some
have speculated the country may be able to attract even greater financial
activity in the wake of Brexit, and emerge as the next leading international
financial center.252 Considering the balance of the factors this speculation
is not all that farfetched, though it may yet prove to be too optimistic.
Of all the factors, the most revealing with respect to the strength of
Singapore’s status as an international financial center is that of state finan-
cial policy. This is because, ever since Singapore claimed independence in
1965, governmental authorities within the nation have engaged in a sys-
tematic effort to establish Singapore as an international financial
249. See, e.g., Liz Hoffman, Wall Street Responds to Trump Immigration Ban, WALL.
ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (Jan. 30, 2017, 11:26 AM) (describing the critical responses from the
CEOs of multiple financial firms to the January immigration ban), http://blogs.wsj.com/
moneybeat/2017/01/30/wall-street-responds-to-trump-immigration-ban/.
250. Around the 1910s Singapore was just emerging as a financial center and had only
reached the level of a significant regional financial center by the 1970s. See Geoffrey Jones,
International Financial Centres in Asia, the Middle East and Australia, in FINANCE AND FIN-
ANCIERS IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 1880–1960 406–07, 410 (Youssef Cassis ed., 2002). A re-
gional financial center is one that provides “financial services to an entire region, which
might be very large ([e.g.,] ‘Asia’ or the ‘Pacific Rim’).” See id. at 406.
251. See GFCI 21, supra note 2, at 4 (showing Singapore as the third-ranked interna-
tional financial center on its index, only twenty points behind New York).
252. See, e.g., id. at 32 (“Singapore seems to be the place that European and North
American financiers are focusing on right now.”) (quoting an anonymous survey respondent,
who is a Head of Investment Banking at a Frankfurt-based firm); Shotter et al., supra note
223 (noting the argument that financial institutions may shift their activities from London to
Singapore post-Brexit to take advantage of high economic growth in Asia).
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center.253 Early on in Singapore’s development, this effort involved the
government providing various business incentives and preferential tax
treatment to drive the creation of the Asian Dollar Market within the na-
tion, which was crucial in fueling its initial development into an interna-
tional financial center.254 As Singapore has continued to develop, its
government has also continued to offer an internationally competitive tax
framework, along with promoting efficient regulatory and legal
frameworks for the nation’s financial sector.255 For example, in the case of
financial regulation, Singapore has developed a reputation for very timely
adoption, and strict implementation, of new global standards.256 This rep-
utation, in turn, has proven to be a benefit for Singapore,257 especially in
the wake of the Financial Crisis as industry perceptions on the importance
of effective financial regulation have shifted.258
In tandem with the factor of state financial policy, the factor of central
banking and monetary policy also weighs in favor of Singapore, due in
large part to its government’s strong stance on financial policy and goal of
establishing Singapore as an international financial center. Critical to Sin-
gapore’s monetary policy system is its central bank, the Monetary Author-
ity of Singapore (“MAS”), which, by law, acts as the nation’s prudential
supervisor, resolution authority, and lender of last resort, in addition to
being responsible for various other regulatory tasks and objectives.259 In
253. See Cassis (2016), supra note 1, at 312.
254. See V. Le Leslé et al., Why Complementarity Matters for Stability—Hong Kong
SAR and Singapore as Asian Financial Centers 9 (IMF Working Note No. WP/14/119, July
2014).
255. See id. at 11, 17.
256. See id. at 28; see also INT’L MONETARY FUND, SINGAPORE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
STABILITY ASSESSMENT 9 (IMF Country Rept. No. 13/325, Nov. 2013) [hereinafter “Singa-
pore FSSA”] (“Singapore is one of the largest financial centers in the world. Apart from its
large and diversified domestic banks, it hosts major international banks attracted by Singa-
pore’s efficient market infrastructure and its well-established reputation for the rule of law
and effective supervision.”).
257. For perspective, in 2012 Singapore received a top rating of 5 in the Economist
Intelligence Unit’s evaluation of the nation’s financial regulatory system, and in 2013 re-
ceived favorable rating in S&P’s Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) anal-
ysis, being placed in group two among the countries of other leading international financial
centers. See Leslé et al., supra note 254, at 41 (citing to the relevant analyses).
258. See id. at 28 (arguing that in the wake of the Financial Crisis of 2008, what may be
considered an appropriate balance between lighter-touch regulation and more effective regu-
lations focused on promoting safety and soundness has been shifting in favor of more effec-
tive regulation, as well-regulated financial centers may be viewed as safe havens during
future crises).
259. See Singapore FSSA, supra note 256, at 26. Specifically, the MSA is responsible for
the following tasks: “conduct[ing] monetary and exchange rate policy[;] act[ing] as the inte-
grated supervisor of the financial sector (including systemically important [financial market
infrastructures] and macroprudential policies)[;] and is the resolution authority for financial
institutions.” Moreover, the MSA has the following objectives: “maintaining price stability
conducive to sustainable economic growth; fostering a sound and reputable financial center
and promoting financial stability; ensuring the prudent and efficient management of Singa-
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some respects, the structure of the MAS as a single point of regulatory
contact within the financial system of Singapore parallels the earlier struc-
ture of the FSA in England, which financial institutions had previously
found to be preferable, especially when compared to a more fractured reg-
ulatory structure like that in the United States. However, structurally
speaking, the powers of the MAS extend even further than those of the
FSA through the incorporation of central banking functions. In this re-
gard, the MAS shares similarities with the United States’ Federal Reserve
System, in that the United States’ central banking system is also responsi-
ble for prudential and supervisory tasks at the federal level, and with su-
pervising financial institutions designated as systemically important by the
Financial Stability and Oversight Council.260
There are some concerns, however, regarding the potential impact of
political involvement within the MAS, especially given its broad regula-
tory mandate over Singapore’s financial system. One notable example of
the intertwining of political elements within the MAS’s structure can be
observed within the organization of the board of the MAS. Specifically,
the board of the MAS is accountable to a designated minister-in-charge of
the MAS, who is in turn accountable to the Singaporean Parliament.261
Furthermore, while the minister-in-charge is directly responsible for man-
aging some of the MAS’s key resolution tools, is it possible for one indi-
vidual to simultaneously hold multiple governmental positions in addition
to their position as the minister-in-charge of the MAS, such as chairperson
of the MAS, minister of finance, deputy prime minister, or all of the
above.262 These intertwining responsibilities and incentives surrounding
the minister-in-charge of the MAS can cause delayed regulatory responses
or conflicting positions between the minister-in-charge and the MAS it-
self.263 Such conflicts or delays could have devastating impacts on the Sin-
gaporean financial system in the event of a crisis because of MAS’s
supervisory responsibility over the system. In addition, this structure of
potentially conflicting political relationships echoes the inefficiencies that
plagued the bygone Amsterdam Wisselbank, which was also partially
caused by conflicting interests between the multiple political bodies that
were involved in its governance.
As for trust, at a glance Singapore appears to have numerous elements
working in its favor. Singapore has developed a reputation among foreign
financial institutions as being one of the primary gateways into the Asian
pore’s official foreign reserves; and growing Singapore as an internationally competitive fi-
nancial center.” See id. at 19.
260. See generally BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS (10th ed. Oct. 2016) (providing a detailed overview of the
regulatory and central banking functions of the Federal Reserve System), available at https://
doi.org/10.17016/0199-9729.10.
261. See Singapore FSSA, supra note 256, at 26.
262. See id. at 26 n.29.
263. See id. at 26.
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financial system, with deep financial expertise and offering a wide array of
supporting service industries.264 Moreover, in considering the element of
relationships, there is a substantial foreign bank presence within Singa-
pore, including branches of several global systemically important banks,265
along with a robust foreign exchange market, despite the fact that the na-
tion’s currency is not widely considered to be a significant international
reserve currency.266 However, in terms of market connections, while Sin-
gapore resembles London in its Wimbledon effect-like reliance on interna-
tional financial activity, the nation’s current level of interconnectivity with
foreign markets lags behind that of comparable financial centers.267 Fur-
thermore, on a more general level, forecasts regarding Singapore’s eco-
nomic growth have been negatively impacted by a recent slowdown in
Asian trade, primarily because of Singapore’s strong reliance on its trade
ties within the region.268
Lastly, with respect to stability, though Singapore has developed a rep-
utation for being a safe haven during economic crises,269 the reliance of its
financial sector on international activity leaves the nation’s financial sector
exposed to cascading risks that originate from deteriorating economic con-
ditions or policy shifts within other regions.270 To an extent, this stability
risk has manifested already through Singapore’s reduced economic growth
forecast because of the recent slowdown in Asian trade, as mentioned
above. Furthermore, there is also a risk that Singapore’s chances to be-
come a viable candidate for surpassing London may be negatively im-
pacted by cascading risks associated with Brexit once its longer-term
effects materialize.271
Thus, Singapore’s strength as a financial center is based largely in state
financial policy and central banking and monetary policy through the im-
mense political and regulatory support underlying the nation’s develop-
ment as an international financial center. Moreover, considering trust,
Singapore’s financial sector has both a strong international reputation and
solid base of experience. While its market connections may yet lag behind
those of other prominent international financial centers, they are ex-
264. See Leslé et al., supra note 254, at 25.
265. See id. at 8–9, 25–27.
266. See id. at 12.
267. See id. at 7–8 (evaluating interconnectivity using “eigenvector centrality, defined as
weighted average of all counterparties’ centrality”). While its current level appears to be
lagging behind comparable international financial centers, Singapore’s connectivity is ex-
pected to continue growing well into the future. See id. at 32.
268. See WEO 2016, supra note 202, at 11, 21.
269. See Leslé et al., supra note 254, at 32–33.
270. See Singapore FSSA, supra note 256, at 6.
271. See, e.g., Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Fi-
nance, Singapore Ministry of Finance, Reply to Parliamentary Questions on the Impact of
Brexit on Singapore (July 11, 2016) (speculating on how the longer-term effects of Brexit
may impact Singapore) (transcript available at http://www.mof.gov.sg/news-reader/articleid/
1672/parentId/ 59/year/2016).
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panding. Where the strength of Singapore’s position might be under-
mined, though, is with respect to potential policy dissonance within its
central bank, the MAS, due to heavy political involvement and instability
through cascading risks originating within other international regions. Of
these two weaknesses, the latter poses more dire risks, as the strength of
Singapore’s position is so intimately tied to the prevailing economic and
policy conditions of regions outside of the nation’s direct control. Espe-
cially in the wake of Brexit, which has the potential to be severely destabi-
lizing depending on the terms that govern England’s withdrawal,
Singapore’s position as a viable candidate is more precarious than one
might think based on the balance of the other factors. In fact, it appears to
be more likely that a destabilizing post-Brexit event of sufficient magni-
tude to render London vulnerable to being surpassed would also have a
severe cascading impact on Singapore itself, and thus impair its chances of
surpassing London.
III. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTERS
A. Historical Parallels to the Decentralization of Financial Activity
Beyond the effects that Brexit may have on the hierarchy of interna-
tional financial centers, a far more fundamental question remains regard-
ing the future of international financial centers more generally. Will
international financial centers continue to remain relevant within the in-
ternational financial system going forward? In addressing this question,
one of the primary threats facing international financial centers appears to
be innovations in disruptive technologies, such as internet-based financial
services and blockchain technology, that have the potential to catalyze
greater fragmentation and decentralization of services within the interna-
tional financial system.272 While international financial centers are not at
risk of disappearing in the near-term,273 whether this will continue to be
the case is largely uncertain. Therefore, to understand the impacts that
emerging disruptive technologies could have on the international financial
system, and whether such impacts could lead to the obsolescence of inter-
national financial centers, this section will briefly contemplate these recent
technological developments and the decentralization of financial activity
in light of historical parallels and current trends. The next section will con-
272. The term “disruptive technology” refers to innovations, such as the internet, that
“typically demonstrate a rapid rate of change in capabilities in terms of price/performance
relative to substitutes and alternative approaches, or they experience breakthroughs that
drive accelerated rates of change or discontinuous capability improvements[,] . . . have broad
reach [of impact[,] . . . have the potential to create massive economic impact[,] . . . [and] have
the potential to dramatically change the status quo.” See MCKINSEY & CO., DISRUPTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES: ADVANCES THAT WILL TRANSFORM LIFE, BUSINESS, AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY i, 2–3 (May 2013), http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/
our-insights/disruptive-technologies. The term was coined by Clayton M. Christensen. See
CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES
CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997).
273. See Cassis (2016), supra note 1, at 314.
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sider the impacts of these emerging disruptive technologies, with a focus
on those of blockchain technology, through the application of the factors
to see what they may reveal about the likelihood that disruptive technolo-
gies will render international financial centers obsolete.
The potential for emerging disruptive technologies to decentralize fi-
nancial activity is actually the latest iteration of a familiar event within the
international financial system. While these recent innovations arguably
lack any clear precedent,274 the event of an increase in the decentraliza-
tion of financial activity is by no means a novel phenomenon. Rather, this
event has been seen in earlier periods where an ascendant financial center
would come to encroach upon the activities of an established financial
center, thus increasing decentralization within the financial system. As
mentioned in the historical analysis above, this kind of event was seen
during Paris’s attempt to overtake London, as Paris became a prominent
clearing center and liquidity provider within the European financial sys-
tem. While Paris’s heavy encroachment into these areas of finance in-
creased the level of decentralization within the international financial
system to an extent, it was insufficient to catalyze a full fragmentation of
activity. Instead, what resulted was the creation of a division of labor be-
tween Paris and London.
Thus, history suggests that a complete decentralization of financial ac-
tivity as a result of emerging disruptive technologies is highly unlikely.
This conclusion is further supported by the current structure of some
global regions of financial activity. For example, the United States’ finan-
cial system currently resembles these historical parallels, in that, despite
the emergence of additional financial centers, such as the rise of Miami as
a key center for financial activity from the Caribbean and Latin
America,275 and the rise of the West Coast financial centers of Silicon Val-
ley and Los Angeles, which have recently been supported by the growing
FinTech sector,276 among others,277 New York has thus far retained its
274. See id.
275. See, e.g., Jan Nijman, Miami’s Rise as a World City, 28 URBAN GEOGRAPHY 92, 96
(2007) (discussing Miami’s development as the “leading city in the Caribbean and Latin
American economies” for “trade, banking, corporate decision-making, and
communication.”).
276. See, e.g., GFCI 21, supra note 2, at 4 (showing San Francisco and Los Angeles as
the sixth and nineteenth highest rated international financial centers on its index evaluating
the relative strength of such financial centers); see also id. at 20 (“Los Angeles seems to be
the place to be in North America. FinTech has made a big mark here and the venture fund
crowd have moved in.”) (quoting an anonymous investor based in Los Angeles); DELOITTE,
CONNECTING GLOBAL FINTECH: HUB REVIEW 2016 44–45 (showing Silicon Valley as a
highly rated FinTech hub based on its index), http://thegfhf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/
Connecting-Global-FinTech-Hub-Review-2016-.pdf.
277. See, e.g., Joel Kotkin & Mike Shires, Welcome to Y’all Street: The Cities Challeng-
ing New York for Financial Supremacy, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2016, 3:38 PM) (discussing the
emergence of financial centers in various regions throughout the United States, such as the
South and Southwestern regions), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2016/08/11/wel
come-to-yall-street-the-cities-challenging-new-york-for-financial-supremacy/#287079f21b52.
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position as the key center for financial activity within the United States.
However, by contrast, the Asian financial system appears to be more vul-
nerable to decentralization, in part because the region lacks a clear key
center for financial activity. This lack of a key center has come about be-
cause there is intense competition between significant established financial
centers, such as Singapore, Hong Kong, and Tokyo,278 as well as the ascen-
dant financial centers within Australia and mainland China,279 for finan-
cial activity within the region. Lastly, while in the wake of Brexit Europe
appears to be vulnerable to an increase in financial activity decentraliza-
tion despite the presence of London as an established international finan-
cial center,280 as discussed above, there is still some potential that a
regional financial center such as Frankfurt could emerge as a candidate to
take London’s place, if needed, and continue the more centralized model
of international finance.
B. Disruptive Technology versus International Financial Centers
Taken together, these historical parallels and current trends reinforce
is the idea that financial centers possess an inherent “sticky” quality, in
that “once a particular [center] has the infrastructure, people, and institu-
tions required, the costs of moving and losing these benefits may outweigh
the gains from being closer to power.”281 Under this view, even if emerg-
ing disruptive technologies have the potential to render international fi-
nancial centers obsolete, whether or not they will be successful in doing so
will likely turn on the ability of these technologies to provide benefits that
significantly outweigh merely maintaining the status quo. In assessing this
possibility, the factors may provide some limited insight on how the advan-
tages of emerging disruptive technologies, such as blockchain technology,
compare against those of established international financial centers.
However, unlike the previous applications of the factors conducted
earlier in this Note, underlying the application of the factors in this inquiry
is a fundamental difference in the kinds of benefits that these respective
models of financial services can provide. Specifically, with respect to inter-
national financial centers, and financial centers more generally, these cen-
tralized models of financial services can generate benefits from what are
278. See GFCI 21, supra note 2, at 4 (showing Hong Kong and Tokyo as the fourth and
fifth highest rated international financial centers on its index evaluating the relative strength
of such financial centers).
279. See id. (showing Sydney and Shanghai as the eighth and thirteenth highest rated
international financial centers on its index evaluating the relative strength of such financial
centers).
280. See generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, BREXIT AND THE COST TO EUROPE OF
FRAGMENTING FINANCIAL SERVICES (Oct. 2016) (speculating on a scenario where financial
services become more fragmented within the European Union post-Brexit), http://www.pwc.
de/de/brexit/assets/brexit-and-the-cost-to-europe-of-fragmenting-financial-services.pdf.
281. See Dame Clara Fuse, External Member, Bank of England, A Changing World; is
Global Still Good? 7 (Feb. 11, 2016) (transcript available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
publications/Documents/speeches/2016/speech883.pdf).
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known as agglomeration economies, or “economies of scale arising from
having an industry cluster in a particular location,”282 which might gener-
ate benefits including: “information spillovers;” access to specialized
equipment or services; the “[a]bility to hire experts from rival close-by
firms;” and increased market liquidity.283 By contrast, disruptive technolo-
gies can generate decentralization benefits that might include: lowered
communication costs; greater spreading of local market knowledge; and
access to “low-cost rental space in locations selected by individual service
providers.”284 By keeping in perspective these fundamental differences
between the benefits that each model of financial activity might provide,
the factors can be applied to compare the relative strengths of leading in-
ternational financial centers.
First, the factor of trust weighs in favor of international financial cen-
ters for the time being. Of the various elements of the factor of trust, the
most significant element weighing in favor of international financial cen-
ters over emerging disruptive technologies is that of experience, due in no
small part to a lack of familiarity with these technologies within the finan-
cial industry. While some financial institutions have begun to experiment
with emerging disruptive technologies, such as using blockchain technol-
ogy to facilitate trade finance transactions,285 there is still a fair amount of
unfamiliarity within the financial industry itself regarding the exact uses
and limitations of these new technologies.286 Moreover, regarding experi-
ence, and also related to the element of relationships, given the various
legal and operational considerations that accompany international finan-
cial transactions, the use of an expert intermediary may still have signifi-
282. See id. at 5.
283. See ROBERT E. GROSSE, THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES 199–200
(2004).
284. See id.
285. See The Blockchain Revolution in Trade Finance, BARCLAYS: INSIGHT & RES.
(Sept. 2016)), https://www.barclayscorporate.com/insight-and-research/trading-and-exporting
/blockchain-revolution-in-trade-finance.html. (providing an overview of Barclays’s letter of
credit transaction executed using blockchain technology).
286. See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, REDRAWING THE LINES: FINTECH’S GROW-
ING INFLUENCE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 12 (Global FinTech Rept. 2017) [hereinafter “PWC
2017”] (showing that among global survey respondents only 20% were “very familiar” with
blockchain technology, while only 4% were “extremely familiar”), https://www.pwc.com/jg/
en/publications/pwc-global-fintech-report-17.3.17-final.pdf; see also Trade Finance: The
Blockchain Revolution, TREASURY TODAY (Sept. 2016) [hereinafter “Treasury Today”]
(quoting Shona Tatchell, Head of Innovation, Trade & Working Capital, Barclays Bank PLC)
(“There is still a great deal of education that needs to be done in the various markets around
the world to make all parties involved in the trade ecosystem comfortable with [blockchain]
technology . . . . Blockchain is a truly collaborative asset, so it is incumbent on all of us who
believe in the power of this technology to ensure that its message is correctly communicated
and to work collaboratively with all parties involved in the trade world to give it the best
chance to succeed.”), https://www.barclayscorporate.com/content/dam/corppublic/corporate/
Documents/Trading-and-Exporting/trade-innovation-article.pdf.
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cant value within the current international financial system.287 These
intermediaries, in turn, benefit substantially from the agglomeration econ-
omies that international financial centers are able to provide through im-
proving their access to various legal, accounting, and other back-office
services necessary to facilitate their business,288 reducing their coordina-
tion costs,289 and reducing information asymmetries among these in-
termediaries through greater access to industry knowledge.290
By contrast, in considering the factor of trust in light of the elements of
relationships and market connections, emerging disruptive technologies
appear to hold some advantages over international financial centers. Par-
ticularly in the case of blockchain technology, transactions executed over a
blockchain network are capable of being carried out entirely on the dis-
tributed and decentralized network without the need of a centralized in-
termediary.291 As a result, unlike international financial centers, the
strength of disruptive technologies as a medium for facilitating the flow of
international financial activities is not contingent on its connections to any
particular market, domestic or foreign, and instead relies upon the rela-
tionships among institutions and individuals incorporated into a given
transaction network.292 Therefore, as these decentralized transaction net-
works expand, and as familiarity and confidence in these emerging tech-
nologies grows within the financial industry, there is a distinct possibility
that these elements may tip the balance of trust in favor of disruptive tech-
nologies over international financial centers.
The factor of central banking and monetary policy also weighs in favor
of international financial centers for the time being. However, this advan-
tage is only to a lesser extent the result of central banks or monetary pol-
icy explicitly favoring international financial centers over emerging
disruptive technologies; rather, this advantage arises more from the cur-
rent compatibility of central banking and monetary policy with the central-
ized model of financial activity that international financial centers provide,
and the lack thereof with the decentralized model that emerging disruptive
technologies provide. In particular, there is concern that emerging disrup-
tive technologies, such as blockchain technology, may undermine the abil-
287. See Andreas Adriano & Hunter Monroe, The Internet of Trust, 53 FIN. & DEV. 44,
47 (2016).
288. See Fuse, supra note 281, at 5 (“[Agglomeration benefits] means playing host to a
raft of quality professional services – legal, accountancy, advisory and specialised IT; these
are needed to facilitate the effective provision of financial services.”).
289. See Peter Maskell, Towards a Knowledge-based Theory of the Geographical Clus-
ter, 10 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 921, 932 (2001).
290. See id.
291. See Treasury Today, supra note 286.
292. See, e.g., Wolfgang Lemacher & Jesse Mcwaters, How Blockchain can Restore
Trust in Trade, WORLD ECON. FORUM. (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/
02/blockchain-trade-trust-transparency/ (discussing that one hurdle to the widespread
proliferation of blockchain-based transactions is convincing institutions and individuals to
join the network).
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ity of central banks to adequately monitor financial activity and hinder
their ability to execute effective monetary policy measures.293 However,
some have also suggested that developments in blockchain technology
could eventually benefit central banks in their implementation of mone-
tary policy by, for example, streamlining central bank settlement proce-
dures,294 or even through writing monetary policy procedures into the
blockchain’s code.295 If these developments prove to be effective, were
central banks to then embrace such blockchain technology among other
disruptive technologies, it is likely that the balance of the factor of central
banking and monetary policy may also come to weigh in favor of disrup-
tive technologies over international financial centers.
State financial policy also weighs in favor of international financial cen-
ters because, like central banking and monetary policy, state financial poli-
cies have not yet embraced these new technologies. Moreover, in
considering state regulatory policies more broadly, emerging disruptive
technologies are also arguably at a greater disadvantage relative to inter-
national financial centers as they often implicate other areas of regulatory
concern, such as data protection and privacy, which are currently per-
ceived among financial industry participants as being some of the most
significant obstacles facing the adoption of such technologies.296 However,
also similar to the factor of central banking and monetary policy, emerging
disruptive technologies may yet come to gain an advantage over interna-
tional financial centers if state policymakers were to embrace them. For
example, in the case of blockchain technology, there is some speculation
that blockchain transaction networks could be structured to enable regula-
tors to come in at a high level as needed to engage in efficient system-wide
monitoring.297 Furthermore, there is also the potential that regulatory
rules could be written into the blockchain’s code to enable ex ante control
over financial transactions by only allowing permissible transactions to be
executed over the transaction networks, as opposed to relying entirely
upon ex post monitoring for breaches.298 On a more general level, the
developing “RegTech” field also presents an opportunity for state policy-
makers to incorporate new technologies into their regulatory framework,
293. See, e.g., Adriano & Monroe, supra note 287, at 47 (“Some are asking whether
bitcoin and other blockchain applications could eventually undermine monetary policy and
financial stability—but the consensus is that there is no immediate risk.”); see also Fuse,
supra note 281, at 5, 8 (noting both how regulators are able to “take a holistic, systemic view
of threats to financial stability” when financial activity clusters in centers, while decentraliza-
tion could undermine regulatory efficacy through “a destructive trend to deep
fragmentation”).
294. See Adriano & Monroe, supra note 287, at 47.
295. See Joichi Ito et al., The Blockchain Will Do to the Financial System what the In-
ternet Did to Media, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Mar. 8, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-
blockchain-will-do-to-banks-and-law-firms-what-the-internet-did-to-media.
296. See PWC 2017, supra note 286, at 13.
297. See Adriano & Monroe, supra note 287, at 47.
298. See Ito et al., supra note 295.
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which would likely tip the balance of this factor in favor of emerging dis-
ruptive technologies to an even greater extent.299 While there is a risk that
such a high-level of technological incorporation would result in the reduc-
tion of meaningful regulatory discretion,300 the possibility remains that
such a level of incorporation into the framework of financial regulation
could tip the balance of the factor of state financial policy in favor of dis-
ruptive technologies.
Lastly, with respect to the factor of stability, international financial
centers hold an advantage over emerging disruptive technologies when
considering safety and soundness concerns merely because, for the time
being, the destabilizing risks that an international financial center faces are
more familiar, while the risks that emerging disruptive technologies may
face are much less certain. Specifically, while emerging disruptive technol-
ogies are not likely as vulnerable to the elements of war, economic crises,
or Brexit-like events like international financial centers are, such technolo-
gies are vulnerable to various cybersecurity threats. For example, in the
case of blockchain technology, there is a possibility that, in the absence of
adequate security measures, hackers could hijack a given transaction net-
work to facilitate the spread of malware throughout the network, and that
such malware would be very difficult to remove from the network once
injected into it.301 Such a destabilizing threat, which would exploit the ad-
vantages of a decentralized transaction network by turning it into a cyber-
attack vehicle,302 may undermine the overall appeal of emerging
disruptive technologies over international financial centers, even if the bal-
ance of the other factors were to tip in favor of such technologies. There-
fore, the question as to whether emerging disruptive technologies can
come to emerge as a clearly superior conduit for international financial
activity relative to international financial centers will turn significantly on
the development of security measures that would adequately ensure the
safety and soundness of such technologies.303
Based on the analysis above, international financial centers do not ap-
pear to be at risk of losing their agglomeration benefits even as more
emerging technologies come to be incorporated into the international fi-
nancial system. Rather, the factors would likely come to weigh in favor of
emerging disruptive technologies more because of their efficiency improv-
299. See PWC 2017, supra note 286, at 13.
300. See, e.g., Ito et al., supra note 295 (“This is not to say the choices Bitcoin currently
offers are perfect. In fact, many economists disagree with Bitcoin’s hard money rule, and
lawyers argue that regulation through code alone is inflexible and doesn’t permit any role for
useful discretion.”) (emphasis added).
301. See Interpol Cyber Research Identifies Malware Threat to Virtual Currencies, IN-
TERPOL: NEWS & MEDIA (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/
2015/N2015-033; see also Hunton & Williams, Blockchain, Cybersecurity and Global Finance,
PRIVACY & INFORMATION SECURITY LAW BLOG (Sept. 30, 2015), available at https://
www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2015/09/30/blockchain-cybersecurity-and-global-finance/.
302. See Hunton & Williams, supra note 301.
303. See, e.g., PWC 2017, supra note 286, at 9.
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ing benefits than because of international financial centers losing their ag-
glomeration benefits. As a result, and in line with the argument regarding
the inherent “sticky” quality of financial centers described above, there is
the potential that, rather than becoming entirely obsolete, international
financial centers will instead incorporate such technologies into their
structure to capture both the efficiency-improving benefits of these tech-
nologies and the agglomeration benefits of financial centers. In turn,
whether such incorporation would maintain the existing model of there
being larger, leading international financial centers with increased inter-
connectivity due to technology, or whether the existing model will shift
more towards something like a series of regional networks composed of
relatively smaller financial centers, will likely depend significantly on the
policy choices made by regulators and the overall adaptability of interna-
tional financial centers to these emerging disruptive technologies.
CONCLUSION
Over the course of history, there have been multiple rise-and-fall cycles
among leading international financial centers, as the leading position has
shifted from Amsterdam, to London, to New York, and back to London.
From these rise-and-fall cycles, one can identify a set of common factors,
the manifestation of which appears to correlate with such cycles: trust; cen-
tral banking and monetary policy; state financial policy; and stability. By
considering the relevant elements that signaled the manifestation of each
individual factor in these historical rise-and-fall cycles, one can come to
understand the scope and limits of these factors, as well as how they may
blend and intermingle with one another. Understanding of the scope and
limitations of these factors allows for their application in a prospective
manner to compare the strength of the current leading international finan-
cial centers. By applying these factors in the wake of the Brexit referen-
dum, while London appears to still be the current leading international
financial center, there are substantial uncertainties surrounding whether
the city will retain that position in the near future. Depending on the terms
agreed upon through the Brexit negotiations, there is a distinct possibility
that London’s position within the hierarchy of international financial cen-
ters will be made vulnerable, thus creating the opportunity for another
financial center to surpass it.
However, previous cycles suggest that an ascendant center must be
able to seize the leading position from the former leading financial center,
rather than merely ascending by virtue of the former leading financial
center being in decline. In other words, it is not sufficient that Brexit
merely weakens London for its position to be overtaken; rather, there
must also be the concomitant rise of another financial center that has the
capacity to assume the role of being the next leading international finan-
cial center. With respect to this consideration, the factors also provide
some guidance in assessing the strength of a candidate financial center’s
position. Through analyzing the relative strength of three candidate finan-
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cial centers from different global regions, Frankfurt from the European
Union, the New York from North America, and Singapore from Asia, it
becomes apparent that while each of these centers possess certain advan-
tages over London, each also possess certain vulnerabilities that may yet
manifest and undermine their respective positions. For Singapore and
Frankfurt, these uncertainties appear to be tied more directly to effects of
Brexit and the results of England’s withdrawal negotiations. For New
York, while it may also be impacted by Brexit, the uncertainties it faces
are more directly tied to domestic policy shifts from within the United
States. Therefore, because of Brexit’s novelty and the uncertainty sur-
rounding its long-term impacts, as well as uncertainty surrounding the
global political climate on a more general level, circumstances suggest
that, for the time being, the guidance the factors can provide in predicting
the next rise-and-fall cycle among leading international financial centers is
quite limited.
Lastly, in considering the future of international financial centers and
the impact that emerging disruptive technologies might have, historical
precedent, though somewhat limited, suggests that there is an inherent
“sticky” quality within the structure of financial centers. Moreover, the
factors suggest that, in the near-term, international financial centers may
yet hold advantages over these emerging disruptive technologies. How-
ever, the factors also suggest that, in the longer term, emerging disruptive
technologies may provide greater advantages over international financial
services. Whether these emerging technologies will subsequently lead to
international financial centers becoming entirely obsolete is less certain
because these centers will likely still retain their agglomeration benefits
even if technology offers a more efficient model of finance. Therefore,
rather than becoming entirely obsolete, international financial centers may
fuse with these technologies to create a new model of financial services
that captures both the efficiency improvements of technology and the ag-
glomeration benefits of financial centers.
